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The Media in the Courtroom: 
Attending, Reporting, Televising Criminal Casest 
PAUL MARCUS* 
[F]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies 
of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose lietween 
them.1 
Americans have always been fascinated by the criminal triai,Z as 
demonstrated by the enormously successful novels,3 plays,4 films,5 and 
television shows6 based on these trials. Criminal trials, however, are not 
only the subject of popular forms of entertainment; they are news. 
Whether the public is involved nationally in a case, such as the Patty 
Hearst or Richard Speck trial, or only locally, the public's interest in the 
criminal trial is great.7 As Justice Douglas stated: "A trial is a public 
t Copyright 1982 by Paul Marcus. 
* A.B. 1968, J.D.1971, University of California at Los Angeles. Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Illinois. This article is a considerably revised and expanded version of a lecture 
given on October 9, 1981, at Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. Funds for 
the lecture were provided by the Addison C. Harris Fund. The excellent research assistance 
of Catherine Wiegand, University of Illinois College of Law, class of 1982, is gratefully 
acknowledged. I also wish to thank my friend and colleague, Professor John E. Nowak, 
for his review of an early draft of this article. 
1 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941). 
2 While the public may well be quite concerned with the criminal trial, most criminal 
cases do not go to trial. As has been consistently pointed out, the vast majority of criminal 
cases are disposed of either through dismissal by the prosecution or through a guilty plea 
arrangement. See Stephenson, Fair Trial, Fair Press: Rights in Continuing Conflict, 46 
BROOKLYN L. REv. 39, 39 n.5 (1979). Still, when one thinks of the criminal justice system, it 
is the trials of people such as Charles Manson, Jean Harris, or the ABSCAM defendants 
which immediately come to mind. 
3 E.g., J. D. VOELKER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958), an intense account of a murder trial. 
• E.g., M. LEVIN, COMPULSION (1957) (based upon Leopold and Loeb trial). 
5 E.g., INHERIT THE WIND (1960), AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (1979). 
• Television has perhaps been the most widely used medium. Films appearing on televi-
sion have ranged from stories of nationally known trials, e.g. HELTER.SKELTER (Charles Man-
son Family case), to cases involving particularly violent crimes such as rapes, to proceedings 
concerning incompetent defendants, e.g., DUMMY (story of Donald Lang). 
7 This interest can remain for considerable periods of time. It would appear that the 
interest in the Bruno Hauptmann case has never died. The defendant there was convicted 
of kidnapping and murdering the Lindbergh child. Questions are still being raised as to 
whether the defendant received a fair trial and whether he actually committed the crimes 
as charged. On October 6, 1981, Governor Brendan T. Byrne of New Jersey announced 
that secret files maintained on the case would be opened in response to claims that an 
innocent man was executed in the "crime of the century." Sullivan, Byrne to Release Lind-
bergh Files, 49 Years After the Kidnapping, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 4. For 
good discussions of the Hauptmann case, see Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from Shep-
pard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 
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event. What transpires in the court room is public property."8 
The interest of the media in criminal trials is among the "purest" in 
the press or speech arena. In such trials one need not be concerned with 
reporting which tends to incite,9 is offensive to the general public,10 may 
unfairly injure reputation,11 or involves purely private activities.12 The 
reporting of the criminal trial is factual, usually timely, and invariably 
newsworthy. As a result, the courts have taken great pains to ensure 
that any interference with media reporting of the criminal trial is minimal. 
The difficulty is that the public interest-albeit entitled to great weight-
may not be the only interest present when a person stands to be deprived 
of his or her liberty through the criminal justice system. There are also 
interests in a fair trial, the rehabilitation of the accused, and the privacy 
of the witnesses and victims. 
While consistently recognizing the news content of criminal trials, courts 
have been faced in recent years with a barrage of claims asking for limita-
tion of media coverage of criminal trials. The Supreme Court has explored 
the claims in some detail in three principle areas: first, the reporting of 
certain facts in a trial, such as the names of the defendants or witnesses; 
second, the proposed limitation of attendance by media representatives 
at pretrial or trial proceedings; and third, the electronic broadcasting of 
criminal trials to the public. In this article I will initially, explore the strong 
first amendment basis for media coverage of criminal trials. I will then 
consider these three areas as they converge with the first amendment 
interest in news gathering. My conclusion is that by recognizing this strong 
first amendment interest, the Supreme Court has treated the media with 
great deference, perhaps too much deference vis-a-vis certain defendants 
as well as witnesses and victims. 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTEREST 
Few would argue with Thomas Jefferson's famous remark, "Our liberty 
depends on freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without be-
ing lost."13 As the Supreme Court said in one of the most famous first 
amendment cases ever decided, the United States has "a profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... "14 The first amendment principle 
STAN L. REV. 393 (1977); Seidman, The Trial and Execution of Brurw Richard Hauptmann: Still 
Another Case that "Will Not Die", 66 GEO. L.J. 1 (1977). 
8 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). 
• See generally Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (conspiracy); Terminiello 
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ("fighting words"). 
10 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity). 
11 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation). 
12 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (invasion of privacy). 
13 9 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239 (J. Boyd ed. 1954). 
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In Sullivan the Court held 
1982] MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM 237 
of free and open speech is readily accepted, and few restrictions will 
generally be allowed.15 The difficulty of applying this basic notion in the 
criminal context is that the criminal defendant often vigorously argues 
that the principles of free speech conflict with his own personal right 
to a fair trial attended by due process. Such a claim has been with this 
country from its earliest roots. The defense lawyer for Aaron Burr claimed 
that jurors could not properly decide the 1807 case because of prejudicial 
articles carried in numerous newspapers.16 Chief Justice Marshall was 
careful to consider the defendant's claims: "The jury should enter upon 
the trial with minds open to those impressions which the testimony and 
the law of the case ought to make, not with those preconceived opinions 
which will resist thos~ impressions."17 
While understanding the potential dangers to the workings of the 
criminal justice system, the courts have been consistently vigilant in 
upholding press rights when arguably in conflict with the rights of the 
defendant. Judges have stressed the great values served by media report-
ing of criminal trials. The Supreme Court has stated: "The press does 
not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscar-
riage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial pro-
cesses to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."18 Similarly, Justice 
Brennan has written: 
Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the 
core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of 
that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the ad-
ministration of government. Secrecy of judicial action can only breed 
ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the com-
petence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, 
and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law 
and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice 
system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting 
it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.19 
In spite of continued media criticism and skepticism concerning the 
judiciary's view of the so-called free press versus fair trial issue,20 the 
that the Constitution requires public officials in defamation cases to prove that the state-
ment of the defendant had been published with actual malice-knowledge of the falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth. The doctrine was later expanded to cover public figures 
as well. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
15 For excellent discussions of the first amendment policy considerations, see Kalven, 
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 
SuP. CT- REv.191; Nimmer, The Right to SpealcFrom Times to Time: First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968). 
11 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). 
17 I d. at 50. See Rq1ort of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free 
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 394 n.2 (1968). 
11 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). 
11 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan J., concurring). 
20 Consider for instance, the comments of well-known journalist Bob Woodward as quoted 
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record of the courts in this regard has generally been impressive. A good 
example of the courts' attention to this matter is the ABSCAM cases.21 In 
several of these cases, media representatives have asked that the tapes, 
which were shown to the jury,22 be turned over to the media so that they 
could be shown on television news. The defendants have argued 
strenuously that the tapes, if shown to the public, could prejudice jury 
pools available for the cases or for retrials, and have contended that a 
delay in showing them on television would not seriously infringe first 
amendment rights. The courts have consistently rejected the defendants' 
claims.23 Judges in these cases have recognized th~ defendants' interests, 
yet have stressed that these interests must be balanced against the public 
interest in immediately seeing matters of such great import.24 
This is not to suggest that courts do not restrict the media in the report-
ing of criminal trials. There have been numerous instances of restrictions. 
Nevertheless, these have been in relatively narrow and unusual cir-
cumstances. For instance, hearings on pretrial evidentiary matters may 
in Stephenson, supra note 2, at 66: " '[T]here is an intense perception within the Court 
that the press is operating outside the public interest, that it is the big guy, the bully.' 
If the press will not police itself ... 'then somebody else will, and the ... Supreme Court 
is poised and anxious to do so.' " 
21 
"'ABSCAM' [is] a coined word from the first two letters of Abdul Enterprises, Ltd. 
and the word 'scam' .... " In re Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945, 947 
(2d Cir. 1980). Abdul Enterprises was the fictional business used in the FBI's "sting" opera· 
tion. Id. 
22 Or in some cases, which were to be shown to the jury at a later time. 
23 In reApplication of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States 
v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); In reApplication of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 
945 (2d Cir. 1980). 
•• The trial judge in the District of Columbia Circuit case had rejected the broadcasters' 
position: 
In denying the broadcasters' application the court relied primarily upon the 
defendants' interest in securing a fair and impartial jury should their cases 
be retried. The court noted that several defense motions were pending before 
it which the court characterized as "not frivolous." If new trials were granted, 
the court stated, release of the tapes would jeopardize the defendants' rights 
because (l) the broadcasters probably would play portions of the tapes at or 
near the beginning of any retrial, accompanied by references to the prior ver· 
diets and the court's rulings on the defendants' motions and (2) the broad-
casters probably would not play the tapes in their entirety, due to time restric-
tions, but would air only selected portions of the tapes in a manner presenting 
the defendants in the most unfavorable light. 
In reApplication of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 614-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnotes 
omitted). The appeals court disagreed: 
Although the trial court characterized the motions filed ... as "nonfrivolous", 
the prospect of a retrial remains speculative. We accordingly still remain wary 
of sanctioning denial of a posttrial application to copy and inspect judicial 
records based on the pendency of new trial requests that may ultimately be 
denied, although they cannot be dismissed at the threshold as frivolous. This 
is not a case where the court has indicated it is inclined to grant a new trial. 
Furthermore, should the presently hypothetical second trial become a reality, 
we find nothing in the record to indicate that there would be significant dif-
ficulty in assembling a panel of the "impartial, 'indifferent' jurors" to which 
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be closed to the press and the public.25 Moreover, in contrast to the 
ABSCAM cases, some trial judges refuse the media physical access to 
items of evidence. In United States v. Gurney, 26 the widely publicized trial 
of the former United States Senator, the media were 'denied access to 
"(1) exhibits not yet admitted into evidence; (2) transcripts of bench con-
ferences held in camera; (3) written communications between the jury 
and the judge; (4) list of names and addresses of jurors; and (5) Mr. 
Gurney's grand jury testimony."27 Recognizing that the trial judge could 
not restrain news coverage of the public trial or deny the media access 
to any information already within the public domain, the court of appeals 
affirmed the district judge's ruling since he had "merely refused to allow 
the appellants to inspect documents not a matter of public record."28 
Quoting from Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in the Billie Sol 
Estes case,29 the court noted that "'[w]hen representatives of the com-
munications media attend trials they have no greater rights than other 
members of the public.' "W The basic notion of Gurney was established 
in the Richard Nixon tapes case, Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 31 
There, too, the media had asked to be able to make copies of items which 
had never been made physically available to the public. The Court 
specifically reaffirmed its first amendment holdings in the area of the 
criminal trial and repeated the words of Justice Black that the public 
trial is "'a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as in-
struments of persecution.' "32 Nevertheless, the Court refused the media 
access to the tapes: 
[T]he press ... was permitted to listen to the tapes and report on 
the defendants would be constitutionally entitled .... We ... think it likely 
... that a significant percentage of the potential jury pool will not see or 
hear the tapes, or if they do, will quickly forget much of what they saw. In 
the words of the Second Circuit, we think there is somewhat of a tendency 
to "frequently overestimate the extent of the public's awareness of news". 
Id. at 616 (footnotes omitted). But see In re Application of KSTP Television, 504 F. Supp. 
360 (D. Minn. 1980). In KSTP, the judge refused to release to television stations videotape 
recordings of the kidnapper and his victim which had been shown at trial. The court recog· 
nized the "general right to inspect and copy public records," id. at 361, but found that 
the public release of the tapes would infringe on the victim's privacy. The court distinguished 
the ABSCAM cases because of the public interest in the tapes shown there. Id. at 363. 
See also Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing access 
to tapes in "Brilab" sting operation case). 
25 Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 82 A.D.2d 963, 440 N.Y.S.2d 779 
(1981) (mem.); see text accompanying notes 95·178 infra. 
28 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Krentzman, 435 U.S. 968 (1978). 
27 Id. at 1207 • 
.. Id. at 1208 . 
., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 584 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
30 558 F.2d at 1208 n.9. 
31 435 u.s. 589 (1978). 
32 Id. at 610 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)). 
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what was heard. Reporters also were furnished transcripts of the tapes, 
which they were free to comment upon and publish .... Thus, the 
issue presented in this case is not whether the press must be permit· 
ted access to public information to which the public generally is 
guaranteed access, but whether these copies of the White House 
tapes-to which the public has never had physical access-must be 
made available for copying .... 
The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to infor-
mation about a trial superior to that of the general public.33 
Thus, the courts will not hesitate to impose some curbs on the ability 
of the media to report the criminal trial. Still, these curbs are imposed 
in relatively rare cases where the public's right to know the circumstances 
of the trial will not be affected. The courts may be unwilling in some 
cases to give up videotapes; they are not willing to issue orders restrict-
ing press coverage or barring media representatives from the criminal 
trial. When the claim of restrictions on the substantive news is raised, 
the press normally prevails. 
PRETRIAL PUBLICITY 
The allegiance of the courts to the media interest has been demonstrated 
quite saliently in several areas, but nowhere as significantly as in the 
pretrial publicity cases. The argument of the defendants in these cases 
is deceptively simple. The Constitution guarantees the defendant a fair 
and public trial in which the state's case will be evaluated by a jury of 
impartial citizens. In cases in which substantial publicity develops after 
the incident in question but before the trial, members of the jury pool 
may become so inundated with information that they cannot fairly review 
the evidence. Such a claim, if proven, would indicate a constitutional viola-
tion. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."34 
"The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot 
be impartial."35 
Few experienced lawyers and judges doubt that the defense claim is 
correct, at least in some cases. Justice Brennan stated: "No one can 
seriously doubt, however, that uninhibited prejudicial pretrial publicity 
may destroy the fairness of a criminal trial .... "36 A committee of federal 
judges chaired by the Honorable Irving R. Kaufman remarked: "[TJhe Com-
33 435 U.S. at 609. But see United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978). In Sielaff spectators were excluded during 
a rape victim's testimony at trial, but members of the media were allowed to attend. 
Upholding this ruling, the court of appeals emphasized the trauma to the victim and the 
lack of any harm to the defendant or the general public. 
"' In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
35 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878). 
36 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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mittee cannot ignore the fact that it has become increasingly apparent 
that in a widely publicized or sensational case, the right of the accused 
to trial by an impartial jury can be seriously threatened by the conduct 
of news media prior to and during trial."37 In his concurring opinion in 
Irvin v. Dowd,38 Justice Frankfurter warned that "such extraneous in-
fluences, in violation of the decencies guaranteed by our Constitution, 
are sometimes so powerful that an accused is forced, as a practical mat-
ter, to forego trial by jury."39 
During the 1960's, at a time when the Supreme Court was carefully 
construing constitutional rights of the accused at trial,40 the Court was 
faced with numerous cases in which strong defense claims were made 
with respect to prejudicial pretrial publicity. Three of these cases, in par-
ticular, were to guide lawyers and judges.41 In Irvin v. Dowd42 residents 
of a small town received an incredible amount of inflammatory publicity 
about the defendant for a six-month period prior to trial, including: defen-
dant's confession to burglaries and murders (made public by an official 
press release), information as to prior convictions of the defendant, and 
his offer to plead guilty to avoid the death penalty, an offer which was 
turned down by the government. The trial judge granted a defense mo-
tion for a change of venue, but under state statute the change could only 
be to an adjacent county which had received basically the same news 
coverage. Defense counsel was able to show bitter citizen prejudice against 
the defendant.43 Four-hundred thirty persons were called for jury service 
37 Report on the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair 
Trial" Issue, supra note 17, at 394. 
38 366 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
""Id. at 730. 
•• During this period the Court decided the following cases: United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218 (1967) (defendant entitled to counsel at postindictment lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment requires substantial warnings to accused undergoing 
custodial interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right 
to counsel applies to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applies 
to states in fourth amendment search and seizure cases). 
u The list of important pretrial publicity cases could be far longer. See, e.g., Murphy 
v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (conviction affirmed where 20 veniremen indicated belief 
of defendant's guilt; no showing of community "poisoned" against defendant); Marshall v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (defendant's conviction reversed because seven sitting 
jurors exposed to news accounts of defendant's prior convictions and arrests); Stroble v. 
California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) (conviction affirmed where defendant failed to show that 
publicity was such as to "necessarily prevent fair trial") . 
•• 366 u.s. 717 (1961). 
43 Id. at 720, 725-27. Sadly, this type of unfortunate atmosphere continues. In People 
v. Botham, __ Colo. __ , 629 P.2d 589 (1981), 89 jurors were explicitly questioned about 
pretrial publicity in a case of widely reported homicides. Eighty-six of the 89 admitted 
to seeing substantial news coverage of the story before being called as jurors. Fifty-seven 
admitted that they felt, prior to trial, that the defendant was guilty as charged. Seven 
of the 14 jurors called to hear the case believed, at one time or another, that the defendant 
was guilty. ld. at 599-600. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding 
that the "pattern of prejudice throughout the community could not be overcome by the 
jurors' assurances of impartiality." ld. at 600. 
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at trial. Two-hundred sixty-eight were excused because they had made 
up their minds with regard to guilt. Eight of the twelve who served as 
jurors thought the defendant was guilty, but indicated that they could 
nevertheless render an impartial verdict. One juror said, "You can't forget 
what you hear and see."44 The defendant's conviction was reversed. The 
Court stated: "With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that 
petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of pub-
lic passion .... "45 
Rideau v. Louisiana46 involved a similar extreme situation. The defen-
dant there was a confessed bank robber who had killed a bank employee 
during the course of the robbery. He was given the death sentence after 
trial. The defendant's confession had been obtained in the jail where he 
was being held the morning following the robbery and murder.47 "A local 
television station had been allowed, perhaps invited, to videotape the con-
fession and the station then broadcast it to tens of thousands of members 
of the community from which the jury was drawn."48 Without explicitly 
finding any actual prejudicial impact on the jury itself,49 the Court reversed 
the defendant's conviction. "Any subsequent court proceedings in a com-
munity so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow 
formality ."50 
No doubt the leading pretrial publicity case is Sheppard v. Maxwell. 51 
The defendant, a well-known Cleveland doctor, was charged with the 
murder of his wife. During the investigation and the trial, the local 
newspapers covered the story in detailed and inflammatory fashion. There 
were daily headlines and editorials indicating the defendant's guilt. Reveal-
ing evidence from the state's case was presented, and public officials were 
accused of "mollycoddling" the defendant.52 Despite the fact that the 
" 366 U.S. at 727-28. 
'
5 Id.The defendant had argued in a sweeping fashion that his conviction should be re· 
versed simply because the public had received such a large amount of information about 
him and about the case. This view the Court rejected: 
It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts 
and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods 
of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest 
of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve 
as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits 
of the case. 
Id. at 722 . 
•• 373 u.s. 723 (1963). 
" Id. at 724-25. 
" Martin v. Warden, Huntingdon State Correctional Inst., 653 F.2d 799, 805 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (discussing Rideau). 
•• Stephenson, supra note 2, at 49. For an interesting debate on the need for such a 
finding, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Poludniak, 657 
F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1981). 
50 373 U.S. at 726. 
Sl 384 u.s. 333 (1966). 
52 Id. at 338-42. The Court described the rather incredible pretrial and trial situation: 
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Supreme Court did not hear the case until twelve years later,53 it ordered 
a new trial for the defendant.54 The Court found that "this deluge of 
During the inquest ... a headline in large type stated: "Kerr [Captain of the 
Cleveland Police] Urges Sheppard's Arrest." In the story, Detective McArthur 
"disclosed that scientific tests at the Sheppard home have definitely established 
that the killer washed off a trail of blood from the murder bedroom to the 
downstairs section," a circumstance casting doubt on Sheppard's accounts of 
the murder. No such evidence was produced at trial. The newspapers also 
delved into Sheppard's personal life. Articles stressed his extramarital love 
affairs as a motive for the crime. The newspapers portrayed Sheppard as a 
Lothario, fully explored his relationship with Susan Hayes, and named a number 
of other women who were allegedly involved with him. The testimony at trial 
never showed that Sheppard had any illicit relationships besides the one with 
Susan Hayes. 
On July 28, an editorial entitled "Why Don't Police Quiz Top Suspect" 
demanded that Sheppard be taken to police headquarters. It described him 
in the following language: · 
"Now proved under oath to be a liar, still free to go about his 
business, shielded by his family, protected by a smart lawyer who 
has made monkeys of the police and authorities, carrying a gun 
part of the time, left free to do whatever he pleases .... " 
A front-page editorial on July 30 asked: "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?" 
It was later titled "Quit Stalling-Bring Him In." 
... Twenty-five days before the case was set, 75 veniremen were called 
as prospective jurors. All three Cleveland newspapers published the names 
and addresses of the veniremen. As a consequence, anonymous letters and 
telephone calls, as well as calls from friends, regarding the impending pro-
secution were received by all of the prospective jurors . 
. . . On the sidewalk and steps in front of the courthouse, television and 
newsreel cameras were occasionally used to take motion pictures of the par-
ticipants in the trial, including the jury and the judge. Indeed, one television 
broadcast carried a staged interview of the judge as he entered the courthouse. 
In the corridors outside the courtroom there was a host of photographers and 
television personnel with flash cameras,' portable lights and motion picture 
cameras. This group photographed the prospective jurors during selection of 
the jury. After the trial opened, the witnesses, counsel, and jurors were 
photographed and televised whenever they entered or left the courtroom. 
Id. at 340-44. 
53 After the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Sheppard's conviction, State v. Sheppard, 
165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956), the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
352 U.S. 910 (1956). Eight years later the United States district court found, on a writ 
of habeas corpus, that Sheppard had been denied due process. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 
F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964). The court of appeals reversed, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), 
allowing the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari and affirm the granting of 
the writ by the district court. · 
"' As the Third Circuit properly pointed out, the Supreme Court in Sheppard did not 
" 'say that Sheppard was denied due process by the judge's refusal to take precautions 
against the influence of pretrial publicity alone' .... [R]ather the Court ordered that a 
writ of habeas corpus issue because the trial judge permitted bedlam to reign at the trial, 
failed to prevent serious disruptive influences in the court, and allowed the intrusion of 
the media on the deliberative processes occurring in the courtroom." Martin v. Warden, 
Huntingdon State Correctional Inst., 653 F.2d 799, 805 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation ommitted) 
(quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354 (1966)). 
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publicity reached at least some of the jury"55 and that "bedlam reigned 
at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the 
entire courtroom .... "56 The Court57 chastised the trial judge for failing 
to protect the defendant's rights. It suggested several protective measures: 
first, limiting the number of reporters in the courtroom and regulating 
their conduct;56 second, "insulating" the witnesses from public interviews;59 
and third, making "some effort to control the release of leads, informa-
tion, and gossip to the press by poiice officers, witnesses, and the counsel 
for both sides."60 The Court added: 
[W]here there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior 
to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case 
until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so 
permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestration of the jury was 
something the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel. If 
publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, 
a new trial should be ordered .... The courts must take such steps 
by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial 
outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the ac-
cused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement offwers coming under the 
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. 
Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affec-
ting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, 
but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.61 
It is not enough for the defendant to show pretrial publicity. As later 
noted, "pretrial publicity-even pervasive, adverse publicity-does not 
inevitably lead to an unfair trial."62 The ultimate question is narrow, as 
stated in the Richard Speck case: "The basic consideration, however, is 
not the amount of publicity in a particular case, but whether the defen-
dant in that case received a fair and impartial trial .... "63 The courts' 
55 384 U.S. at 357. For a more recent VE)rsion of this sort of pretrial publicity problem, 
see Commonwealth v. Daugherty, 493 Pa. 273, 426 A.2d 104, 106 (1981). 
56 384 U.S. at 355. 
57 Only Justice Black dissented, without opinion. Id. at 363. 
58 Id. at 358. 
59 Id. at 359. 
"'Id. 
61 I d. at 363 (emphasis in original). The handling of the trial of Dr. George Nichopoulos, 
Elvis Presley's doctor, who was charged with overprescribing drugs for Presley and others, 
is instructive. In that case, the Memphis trial judge, cognizant of the immense publicity, 
issued detailed and careful orders regulating the use of cameras and sound equipment in 
the lobbies of the courtroom. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, § A, at 16, col. 6. 
62 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). In some cases there will 
be no prejudice even with great pretrial publicity due to the passage of time between 
the underlying incident and the court proceedings. In State v. Beavers, 394 So. 2d 1218 
(La. 1981), the crime was alleged to have been committed in January 1972. The testimony 
showed that most coverage of the incident had died down in Baton Rouge following the 
original trial in April 1973. Certainly, in 1980 (at the time of the retrial) evidence would 
fail "to establish clearly the existence of such prejudice in the collective mind of the com-
munity as to make a fair trial impossible." Id. at 1225. 
63 People v. Speck, 41 III. 2d 177, 183, 242 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1968). 
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adherence to this principle, as well as the general deference given to the 
rights of the media in criminal cases, is demonstrated in the case which 
arose after a trial judge attempted to eliminate all difficulties with pre-
judicial pretrial publicity. 
NEBRASKA PRESS ASSOCIATION v. STUART64 
The state trial judge in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart took the 
Supreme Court's suggestions to heart and "acted responsibly, out of a 
legitimate concern, in an effort to protect the defendant's right to a fair 
trial."65 The defendant was accused of murdering six members of a family 
in a Nebraska town of about 850 people. The crime attracted widespread 
news coverage, locally and nationwide. Three days after the crime, both 
the prosecuting attorney and the defense counsel asked the trial court 
to enter an order relating to " 'matters that may or may not be publicly 
reported or disclosed to the public' " due to the " 'mass coverage by news 
media' and the 'reasonable likelihood of prejudicial news which would make 
difficult, if not impossible, the impaneling of an impartial jury and tend 
to prevent a fair trial.' "66 After hearing argument, the judge entered an 
order which prohibited all persons in attendance from "'releas[ing] or 
authoriz[ing] the release for public dissemination in any form or manner 
whatsoever any testimony given or evidence adduced.' "67 The Nebraska 
Supreme Court altered the order somewhat,66 but defended the restric-
tions which were being imposed because of the defendant's vital interest 
in a trial by an impartial jury.69 The modified order prohibited reporting 
of three items: first, confessions or admissions made by the defendant 
to law enforcement officers; second, confessions or admissions made to 
other persons (except members of the press); and third, other facts 
"strongly implicative of the accused.''70 The order expired when the jury 
was impaneled.71 
"' 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For good discussions of the case, see NOWAK. ROTUNDA & YouNG, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 765-67 (1978); Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
539 (1977); Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contrac-
tion of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431 (1977). 
65 427 U.S. at 555 . 
.. Id. at 542. 
07 Id. The lower court, though not the state supreme court, also required members of 
the press to observe the Nebraska bar-press guidelines, which were voluntary standards 
adopted by members of the state bar and news media to deal with the reporting of crimes 
in criminal trials. Id. at 542, 545, n.l. Members of the media expressed great skepticism 
as to the likely result of this case when it reached the United States Supreme Court. See 
note 99 infra. 
"" State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 801, 236 N.W.2d 794, 805 (1975). 
•• Id. at 799-801, 236 N.W.2d at 804-05. 
70 Id. at 801, 236 N.W.2d at 805. 
71 427 U.S. at 546. Though the order expired, the Court concluded that the case was 
not moot because the defendant could be retried and because similar orders could be entered 
in the State of Nebraska. Id. at 546-47. 
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Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, began by noting that the 
conflict between the right to a free press and the right to a fair trial 
was "almost as old as the Republic."72 After looking to the many pretrial 
publicity cases,73 he concluded that the cases showed that pretrial publicity, 
even adverse publicity, would not necessarily lead to an unfair trial. In-
stead, it was the judge's responsibility to make sure that the jury im-
paneled could fairly and impartially resolve the issues in the case.74 
Balanced against this right to a fair trial was the constitutional restric-
tion against limitations on freedom of the press. The Court was especially 
troubled by "orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular 
information or commentary-orders that impose a 'previous' or 'prior' 
restraint on speech."75 After exploring earlier first amendment decisions/6 
the Court concluded that "prior restraints on speech and publication are 
the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amend-
ment rights."77 Although the Court refused to hold that prior restraints 
on news agencies in criminal trials were per se unconstitutional,78 it was 
careful to evaluate the facts in the record to determine whether such 
facts supported "the entry of a prior restraint on publication, one of the 
most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence."79 Looking to 
three important factors, the Court decided that the prior restraint in this 
case was unjustified. 
The first question was whether the trial judge was correct in deter-
mining that there would be intense pretrial publicity about the case. All 
members of the Court had little trouble concluding that the trial judge 
was right.80 The news media were overwhelming the small Nebraska town, 
subjecting the case to intense scrutiny and publicity. The next question 
was whether measures other than a prior restraint would have reduced 
the pretrial publicity. Placing the burden heavily on the state, the Court 
found that there was no finding that alternatives would have failed to 
protect the defendant's rights. The alternatives were change of venue, 
12 Id. at 547. 
73 In particular, the Chief Justice considered the Irvin, Rideau, and Sheppard cases. I d. 
at 551-55. For discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 42-61 supra. 
" 427 U.S. at 554-55. 
75 Id. at 556. 
76 The Court relied heavily on Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) 
("[I]t has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the 
[first amendment] to prevent previous restraints upon publication."), and on New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 427 U.S. at 556-62. 
77 Id. at 559. 
78 Id. at 570. But see id. at 572-617 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussed 
in text accompanying notes 75-79 infra). Media representatives argued strongly that a per 
se rule should be adopted because of the large number of prior restraints and gag orders 
which had been issued in response to adverse pretrial publicity claims. See 65 ILL. B.J. 
469, 471 (1977). 
79 427 U.S. at 562. 
80 Id. at 562-63. 
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postponement of the trial, substantial questioning of respective jurors, 
and instructions to the jurors on their sworn duties.81 Additionally, the 
Justices wondered how effective the restraining order in this case would 
have been in preventing prejudicial publicity. Noting that the trial court 
could not have jurisdiction over news agencies not physically present in 
court, and further noting that areas not specified in the order might well 
prove to be prejudicial, the Court found it unlikely that the judge's order 
would have protected the defendant's rights.82 
The Chief Justice stopped short of holding that a prior restraint order 
could never be issued in connection with adverse pretrial publicity,83 but 
made clear that it would be the rare case in which such an order would 
be constitutionally valid.84 In the instant case, the Court held: 
[W]ith respect to the order entered in this case prohibiting reporting 
or commentary on judicial proceedings held in public, the barriers 
have not been overcome; to the extent that this order restrained 
publication of such material, it is clearly invalid. To the extent that 
it prohibited publication based on information gained from other 
81 Id. at 563-65 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)). Justice Erickson 
of the Colorado Supreme Court explores these alternatives in Erickson, Fair Trial and 
Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REV. 485 (1977). 
"" 427 U.S. at 566-67. In addition, the Court expressed some question as to the impact 
of media coverage as opposed to the normal rumor mill present in a small community. 
In a community of 850 people, "rumors would travel swiftly by word of mouth [and] could 
•.• be more damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts. But ... a whole community 
cannot be restrained •... " Id. at 567. One commentator argues that pretrial publicity will 
rarely affect the jury: 
The short of my conclusions is that newspaper publicity, or any other asser-
tions of the facts of a case made outside of court, have virtually no impact 
upon the jury trying the case. It is not that all jurors are without preju-
dice .... In deciding the case before them, however, the jurors almost in-
variably assumed as a matter important to their status that they knew .more 
about the facts of the case tha.n any newspaper reporter and that their superior 
understanding was due to their close observation of the trial itself. Moreover, 
I have reason to believe that jurors, like most other Americans, mistrust the 
accuracy of specific statements reported in the press and have a poor memory 
for these things. They seem to be much more influenced by other jurors' 
arguments, during deliberations, and generally the debates and social pressures 
of deliberation determine the verdict. 
Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REV. 621, 623 (1977). For excellent discussions 
of the empirical evidence in this area, see Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska 
Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News C()1Jerage?, 
29 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977); J. Buddenbaum, D. Weaver, R. Holsinger & C. Brown, Pretrial 
Publicity and Juries: A Review of Research Undiana University School of Journalism, March 
1981). 
83 The Chief Justice stated: 
However difficult it may be, we need not rule out the possibility of showing 
the kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess the requisite degree 
of certainty to justify restraint. This Court has frequently denied that First 
Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the proposition 
that a prior restraint can never be employed. 
427 U.S. at 569-70. 
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sources, we conclude that the heavy burden imposed as a condition 
to securing a prior restraint was not met .... 85 
The Chief Justice's opinion strongly reaffirmed the important first 
amendment interest in the reporting of criminal trials in a timely and 
unrestricted fashion. Still, other members of the Court had an even 
stronger view of the first amendment guarantee, though they recognized 
the important rights of the defendant to a fair trial. Justice White stated 
that there was "grave doubt" in his mind "whether orders with respect 
to the press such as were entered in this case would ever be justifiable."86 
Justice Powell wrote: 
In my judgment a prior restraint properly may issue only when 
it is shown to be necessary to prevent the dissemination of prejudicial 
publicity that otherwise poses a high likelihood of preventing, directly 
and irreparably, the impaneling of a jury meeting the Sixth Amend-
ment requirement of impartiality. This requires a showing that (i) there 
is a clear threat to the fairness of trial, (ii) such a threat is posed 
by the actual publicity to be restrained, and (iii) no less restrictive 
alternatives are available. Notwithstanding such a showing, a restraint 
may not issue unless it also is shown that previous publicity or publicity 
from unrestrained sources will not render the restraint inefficacious. 
The threat to the fairness of the trial is to be evaluated in the con-
text of Sixth Amendment law on impartiality, and any restraint must 
comply with the standards of specificity always required in the First 
Amendment context.87 
The strongest position in favor of the media was taken by Jus-
tice Brennan, with whom Justices Stewart and Marshall joined. He began 
by conceding that the right to a fair trial was " 'the most fundamental 
of all freedoms' "88 and "essential to the preservation and enjoyment of 
all other rights, providing a necessary means of safeguarding personal 
liberties against government oppression,"89 and that "uninhibited pre-
judicial pretrial publicity may destroy the fairness of a criminal trial."90 
Nevertheless, he concluded that courts cannot impose any prior restraints 
"on the reporting of or commentary upon information revealed in open 
court proceedings, disclosed in public documents, or divulged by other 
sources with respect to the criminal justice system .... "91 As the Chief 
Justice had written, Brennan found that there were numerous alternatives 
to prior restraint. Justice Brennan did not find that there was any in-
84 Id. at 570. See also Note, Prior Restraint on Media Publication to Protect Criminal 
Trial Must Meet Strict Requirements, 25 U. KAN. L. REV. 258 (1977). 
85 427 U.S. at 570. 
86 Id. at 570·71 (White, J., concurring). 
87 Id. at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring). 
88 Id. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965)). 
88 Id. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
90 Id. at 587. 
•• Id. at 612. 
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herent conflict between the free press and fair trial rights,92 but he made 
clear that the potential for harm resulting from prior restraints was great 
and the interests of the first amendment were paramount in resolving 
whatever conflict might exist: 
Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the 
core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of 
that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the ad-
ministration of government. Secrecy of judicial action can only breed 
ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the com-
petence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, 
and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law 
and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice 
system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting 
it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.93 
Some may argue that the majority of the Court in Nebraska Press did 
not go far enough in rejecting the notion of prior restraints in the pretrial 
publicity cases even though all members of the Court heavily emphasized 
the first amendment interest in news media coverage of criminal trials. 
In the period immediately after the case numerous groups of lawyers, 
judges, and journalists were formed to study the matter and all "defer-
red" to the first amendment interests by suggesting methods for the 
elimination of potentially unfair pretrial publicity other than the prior 
restraint.9' With respect to the competing interest of the fair trial, the 
But I would reject the notion that a choice is necessary, that there is an 
inherent conflict that cannot be resolved without essentially abrogating one 
right or the other ...• For although there may in some instances be tension 
between uninhibited and robust reporting by the press and fair trials for 
criminal defendants, judges possess adequate tools short of injunctions against 
reporting for relieving that tension. 
Id. at 611-12. 
93 Id. at 587. Justice Stevens chose not to answer the question of whether a per se rule 
against prior restraints was required under the Constitution. He indicated, however, that 
he subscribed to most of what Justice Brennan said and "if ever required to face the issues 
squarely, [I] may well accept his ultimate conclusion." ld. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
90 See Stephenson, supra note 2, at 51-52. Typical of the study groups' approaches is 
Standard 8-3.5 of 2 ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAm TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (2d 
ed. 1980), which provides as follows: 
(a) If there is a substantial possibility that individual jurors will be inel-
igible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the ex-
amination of each juror with respect to exposure shall take place outside the 
presence of other chosen and prospective jurors. An accurate record of this 
examination shall be kept by court reporter or tape recording whenever pos-
sible. The questioning shall be conducted for the purpose of determining what 
the prospective juror has read and heard about the case and how any exposure 
has affected that person's attitude toward the trial, not to convince the pros-
pective juror that an inability to cast aside any preconceptions would be a 
dereliction of duty. · 
(b) Both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror's testimony as 
to state of mind are relevant to the determination of acceptability. A prospec-
tive juror testifying to an inability to overcome preconceptions shall be sub-
ject to challenge for cause no matter how slight the exposure. If the prospec-
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first amendment interest put forth by media representations has fared 
well in the pretrial publicity cases, at least when confronted with prior 
restraints. In very different areas the approaches taken by trial judges 
have not been as extreme as in Nebraska Press. In these areas interests 
other than the fair trial claim are powerfully asserted. Again, however, 
the first amendment interest as manifested in free press access to criminal 
trials normally fares quite well. 
THE BALANCE OF COMPETING INTERESTS 
A. Closing the Proceedings 
After Nebraska Press it became apparent that a prior order restricting 
coverage of the pretrial and trial proceedings would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain.95 On the other hand, the Court in Nebraska Press 
had made clear that in many cases prejudicial pretrial publicity will 
seriously and adversely affect the opportunity of the defendant to receive 
a fair trial. The question then became: How should the courts proceed 
with respect to protecting the defendant's interest without unduly restrict-
ing the news media coverage of the public event? The obvious answer 
for many judges was to close portions of the proceedings. If closure were 
successful, information available only during those proceedings would not 
become generally available to the public. The argument in favor of closure 
became particularly compelling when the news reports by the media 
related to evidence which would be inadmissible at trial. Such inadmissible 
evidence could include "the past criminal record of the defendant [and] 
tive juror remembers information that will be developed in the course of the 
trial, or that may be inadmissible but does not create a substantial risk of 
impairing judgment, that person's acceptability shall turn on the credibility 
of testimony as to impartiality. If the formation of an opinion is admitted, 
the prospective juror. shall be subject to challenge for cause unless the ex-
amination shows unequivocally the capacity to be impartial. A prospective 
juror who has been exposed to and remembers reports of highly significant 
information, such as the existence or contents of a confession, or other in· 
criminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence, or substantial 
amounts of inflammatory material, shall be subject to challenge for cause 
without regard to the prospective juror's testimony as to state of mind. 
(c) Whenever there is a substantial likelihood that, due to pretrial publicity, 
the regularly alotted number of peremptory challenges is inadequate, the court 
shall permit additional challenges to the extent necessary for the impaneling 
of an impartial jury. 
(d) Whenever it is determined that potentially prejudicial news coverage 
of a criminal matter has been intense and has been concentrated in a given 
locality in a state (or federal district), the court shall have authority in jurisdic-
tions where permissible to draw jurors from other localities in that state (or 
district). 
95 Recall that in Nebraska Press it was not at all certain whether a majority said that 
a prior restraint would ever be valid. See notes 86-93 & accompanying text supra. 
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illegally seized evidence or confessions that . . . are constitutionally 
inadmissible."96 This type of argument led to revised American Bar 
Association standards allowing for the exclusion of the public from pretrial 
as well as trial hearings which would normally be held outside the presence 
of the jury.97 
If the closure cases had been limited to cases in which it was vital for 
the fairness of the trial to close the hearings,98 and if it was clear that 
no alternative would solve the problem,S9 the major constitutional debate 
might not have occurred. The cases were not so limited. As Carl Stern, 
NBC news correspondent and also an attorney, put it, 
The courts were not placed outside the sort of public supervision that 
lies at the very heart of self-government .... Yet, lawyers ... are 
trained to think in terms of secrecy. [The lawyer's] first instinct is 
90 Kaplan, Free Press/Fair Trial Rights in Conflict: Freedom of the Press and the Rights 
of the Individual, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1976). 
91 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, supra note 94, 
at Standard 8-3.6(d). This standard provides: 
If the jury is not sequestered, the defendant shall be permitted to move 
that the public, including representatives of the news media, be excluded from 
any portion of the trial that takes place outside the presence of the jury if: 
(i) the dissemination of information from the hearing would pose a clear 
and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and 
(ii) the prejudicial effect of such information on the jurors cannot be avoided 
by any reasonable alternative means. With the consent of the defendant, the 
court may take such action on its own motion or at the suggestion of the pro-
secution. Whenever such action is taken, a complete record of the proceedings 
from which the public has been excluded shall be kept and shall be made 
available to the public following the comple'tion of the trial or earlier if consis-
tent with trial fairness. Nothing in this recommendation is intended to interfere 
with the power of the court, in connection with any hearing held outside the 
presence of the jury, to caution those present that !lissemination of specified 
information by any means of public communication, prior to the rendering 
of the verdict, may jeopardize the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
•• In the terms of the ABA Standards, "a clear and present danger to the fairness of 
the trial." Id. 
99 The obvious alternatives would be an intensive voir dire or a change of venue. For 
views of the effectiveness of these techniques, compare the statements made by news cor-
respondent Carl Stern with those by law professor John Kaplan: 
But right now there are very few barriers to a judge closing his courtroom 
or moving a substantial portion of a proceeding into chambers .... The judges 
say it happens only in controversial cases, and of course, that is true. But 
it probably is the controversial ones (where the judges are most likely to im-
pose restraints) that are precisely the ones the public has the greatest need 
and right to know about. . . • 
... The Task Force in which I participated found there was no reason to 
close pretrial proceedings or to issue gag orders except in those rare cases 
where the life of an informant or witness might be endangered. While the 
voir dire may not be a perfect device, the evidence is persuasive that a jury 
can be found in virtually every case that has not been influenced by pretrial 
publicity. Most pretrial publicity occurs months before the actual date of trial 
and has subsided or been dissipated in a swirl of conflicting accounts .... 
I remember that in the Mitchell-Haldeman-Erlichman trial, approximately three 
prospective jurors out of each 75-member panel swore they'd never even heard 
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to ask to see the judge privately, to have some closed-door hearings . 
. . . But what it all adds up to is that many lawyers still don't ap-
preciate that when a case gets down to a public courthouse, it is no 
longer a private matter.100 
The question was put at issue in cases where it did not seem that closure 
was essential to the fairness of the trial, or where reasonable alternatives 
had not been attempted. In those cases the news media became concerned 
that they were being closed out of the proceedings for no good reason. 
In such cases, 101 the media contended that they had a first amendment 
right to attend the proceedings; this position led to the Court's decision 
in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale. 102 
The defendant in Gannett questioned whether the public has a "con-
stitutional right to ... access to a pretrial judicial proceeding, even though 
the accused, the prosecutor and the trial judge all have agreed to the 
closure of that proceeding in order to assure a fair trial."103 The police 
in a suburb of Rochester, New York, investigated the disappearance of 
a man who seemed to have met a violent death. Two Rochester 
of Watergate .. .! ... Pretrial publicity may make it more expensive to select 
a jury, more time-consuming perhaps; those are the tradeoffs we make in a 
free society to keep the workings of our courts open. 
Stern, Free Press/Fair Trial The Role of the News Media in Developing and Advancing Con-
stitutional Processes, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 349, 358 (1976). 
[A) change of venue, in some cases, will work .... But in some cases it won't 
.... I know of no persuasive evidence that voir dire will solve the problems 
of reporting criminal records or illegaly seized evidence .... There were three 
people, I believe, who, in the Watergate voir dire said they had never heard 
of Watergate. That is all very well, but it seems to me that just as we want 
an unprejudiced jury, we want a jury that has no imbeciles .... 
So, this really is a problem, and it is not a problem where we can say, "Well, 
there is a first amendment," because we happen to have a fifth amendment 
with a due process clause, and we also have a sixth amendment which talks 
about impartial juries. There is a flat conflict, and there is just simply no 
way to get around it. 
Kaplan, supra note 96, at 362. 
100 Stern, supra note 99, at 356. In a concurring opinion in Westchester Rockland 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 446, 399 N.E.2d 518, 527, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 
640 (1979), Chief Judge Cooke responded to a request for closure: 
[M]erely because a pending prosecution has aroused public interest does not 
lead inexorably to the conclusion that the fair trial rights of the defendant 
would be irrevocably prejudiced, or even jeopardized, by reports of what has 
transpired in pretrial proceedings. Such a conclusion would result in an unfor-
tunate paradox: the greater the interest in a particular prosecution, the more 
apt the defendant to claim the possibility of prejudice and, concomitantly, the 
more likely that the proceeding will be isolated from public scrutiny. 
101 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 99, at 357; see generally Comment, Richmond Case Widens 
Access, Spawns Doubts, 66 A.B.A.J. 946, 947 (1980). 
102 443 U.S. 368 (1979). For a good discussion of the case, see BeVier, An Informed Public, 
An Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482 (1980). 
103 443 U.S. at 370-71. While the Court first pointed out that the district attorney simply 
"did not oppose the motion," id. at 375, the opinion later went on to state that in the case 
"the defendants, the prosecutor, and the judge all agreed that closure of the pretrial sup· 
pression hearing was necessary to protect the defendants' right to a fair trial." I d. at 382 n.ll. 
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newspapers gave considerable coverage to the disappearance and the later 
tracking down of the suspects in Michigan. Articles provided background 
information on the victim's life and the manner in which it was thought 
the victim had been killed. Coverage included the arraignment of the 
defendants on murder charges, the indictment, and the defendants' pleas 
of not guilty. The defendants moved to suppress statements on the ground 
that they had been given involuntarily; they also attempted to suppress 
evidence seized as fruits of the confessions. A hearing was scheduled by 
the trial judge on the motions.104 At the hearing defense attorneys argued 
that the adverse publicity in the newspaper stories had affected the ability 
of the defendants to receive a fair trial. They requested that the public 
and press be excluded from the hearings on the motions to suppress. The 
district attorney did not oppose this request, and it was granted by the 
trial judge.105 The trial judge stated, however, that in his view the press 
had a constitutional right of access ~o the hearing, but that this right 
"had to be balanced against the constitutional right of the defendants 
to a fair trial."106 Finding that an open hearing would pose a "reasonable 
probability of prejudice to thes~ defendants,"107 the judge ruled that "the 
interest of the press and the public was outweighed in this case by the 
defendants' right to a fair trial."108 
Writing for the Court/09 Justice Stewart initially stressed the impor-
tant role of the trial judge in determining that the defendants' due pro-
cess rights were protected: "[A] trial judge has an affirmative constitu-
tional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity."110 He 
described why the trial judge's obligation was particularly important in 
cases involving pretrial motions to suppress: 
Publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings such as the one 
involved in the present case poses special risks of unfairness. The 
whole purpose of such hearings is to screen out unreliable or illegally 
obtained evidence and insure that this evidence does not become known 
to the jury. Publicity concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hear-
ing, however, could influence public opinion against a defendant and 
inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inadmissible 
at the actual trial. 
The danger of publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings 
is particularly acute, because it may be difficult to measure with any 
degree of certainty the effects of such publicity on the fairness of 
104 Id. at 371-75. At least seven stories appeared in each of the two newspapers before 
the pretrial motions were made. Id. 
105 Id. at 375. 
1 
.. Id. at 376. 
101 Id. 
108 Id. 
100 Justice Stewart began his discussion by finding, as in Nebraska Press, that the dispute 
was not moot, as it was one which was "'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Id. 
at 377 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). 
110 Id. at 378 (citation omitted). 
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the trial. After the commencement of the trial itself, inadmissible pre-
judicial information about a defendant can be kept from a jury by 
a variety of means. When such information is publicized during a 
pretrial proceeding, however, it may never be altogether kept from 
potential jurors. Closure of pretrial proceedings is often one of the 
most effective methods that a trial judge can employ to attempt to 
insure that the fairness of a trial will not be jeopardized by the 
dissemination of such information throughout the community before 
the trial itself has even begun.111 
The opinion recognized "a strong societal interest in public trials,"112 
but remarked that such an interest "is a far cry ... from the creation 
of a constitutional right on the part of the public."113 Concluding that the 
sixth amendment guarantee of a public trial was for the benefit of the 
defendant, 114 the Court rejected the media's claim that "members of the 
general public have a constitutional right to attend a criminal trial," stating 
that "the history of the public-trial guarantee ... ultimately demonstrates 
no more than the existence of a common-law rule of open civil and criminal 
proceedings."115 
The opinion in Gannett raised more questions than it answered. While 
the basic question was whether the press had a constitutional right to 
attend the pretrial hearing, there was considerable discussion in the case 
as to the right of the public to attend trials as opposed to pretrial 
hearings.116 While the media petitioners also argued that members of the 
press and the public had a right of access to pretrial hearings by reason 
of the first and fourteenth amendments, the Court reserved this ques-
tion. Assuming arguendo that the media did have such a right, as the 
trial judge had held, the trial judge himself had found "under the cir-
cumstances of this case, that this right was outweighed by the defen-
dants' right to a fair trial."117 These difficult questions were left to be 
111 Id. at 378·79 (citation and footnote omitted). 
112 Id. at 383. The opinion continued: "Openness in court proceedings may improve the 
quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony, 
cause all trial participants to perform their duties more conscientiously, and generally give 
the public an opportunity to observe the judicial system." ld. 
113 Id. 
"' ld. at 380. The Court also stated: 
All of this does not mean, of course, that failure to close a pretrial hearing, 
or take other protective measures to minimize the impact of prejudicial public-
ity, will warrant the extreme remedy of reversal of a conviction. But it is pre-
cisely because reversal is such an extreme remedy, and is employed in only 
the rarest cases, that our criminal justice system permits, and even encourages, 
trial judges to be overcautious in ensuring that a defendant will receive a 
fair trial. 
Id. at 379 n.6. 
115 Id. at 384. 
116 Several times the opinion referred to the alleged sixth amendment right "to a public 
trial," and the right to "attend criminal trials." See id. at 382-84, 387. 
111 ld. at 393. 
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partially answered by other opinions in the case, and by Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 118 
The Chief Justice, concurring in Gannett, argued that the holding in 
the case was limited to pretrial proceedings rather than trials and that 
different considerations were involved in the two.119 Justice Powell, also 
concurring, agreed with the Chief Justice; however, he would have held 
explicitly that the reporters had an interest "protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial suppression 
hearing."120 While finding such a first amendment right, he concluded that 
there might be situations in which the "unrestrained exercise of First 
Amendment rights poses a serious danger to the fairness of a defendant's 
trial."121 Consequently, the defendant's sixth amendment trial interest 
would have to be weighed against the first amendment right of the media 
to report the court proceedings. Distinguishing Nebraska Press, 122 he con-
cluded that with a proper test, the judge could order closure in spite of 
the strong public interest in the case.123 
Like Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist reached the first amendment 
issue raised by the media. However, he rejected the "proposition ... that 
the First Amendment is some sort of constitutional 'sunshine law' that 
requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and substantial reasons before 
a government proceeding may be closed to the public and press."124 
The four dissenters/25 in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, re-
jected the view that "if the defense and the prosecution merely agree 
to have the public excluded from a suppression hearing, and the trial judge 
does not resist-as trial judges may be prone not to do, since nonresistance 
115 448 u.s. 555 (1980). 
119 See 443 U.S. at 394-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
120 Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
121 Id. at 399. 
122 I d. ("[T]he gag order at issue in Nebraska Press ... involved a classic prior restraint 
•... In the present case ... we are confronted with a trial court's order that in effect 
denies access only to one • . . source."). 
123 Id. at 401. (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated the following test: 
[I]t is the defendant's responsibility as the moving party to make some show-
ing that the fairness of his trial likely will be prejudiced by public access to 
the proceedings. Similarly, if the State joins in the closure request, it should 
be given the opportunity to show that public access would interfere with its 
interests in fair proceedings or preserving the confidentiality of sensitive in-
formation. On the other hand, members of the press and public who object 
to closure have the responsibility of showing to the court's satisfaction that 
alternative procedures are available that would eliminate the dangers shown 
by the defendant and the State. 
I d. 
121 Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He relied on the Court's rulings, in a series 
of cases, indicating that there was no special right of access in the press to investigate 
prisons or to speak with prisoners. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe 
v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
125 Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined the dissent. 443 U.S. at 406. 
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is easier than resistance-closure shall take place .... "126 They concluded 
that the sixth amendment to the Constitution "prohibits the States from 
excluding the public from a proceeding within the ambit of the Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee without affording full and fair consideration to 
the public's interests in maintaining an open proceeding."127 The dissenters 
stressed the significance of many pretrial proceedings and the need for 
the media to report them: 
[T]he suppression hearing resembles and relates to the full trial in 
almost every particular .... Each side has incentive to prevail, with 
the result that the role of publicity as a testimonial safeguard, as a 
mechanism to encourage the parties, the witnesses, and the court to 
a strict conscientiousness in the performance of their duties, and in 
providing a means whereby unknown witnesses may become known, 
are just as important for the suppression hearing as they are for the 
full trial. 
Moreover, the pretrial suppression hearing often is critical, and it 
may be decisive, in the prosecution of a criminal case. If the defen-
dant prevails, he will have dealt the prosecution's case a serious, 
perhaps fatal, blow; the proceeding often then will be dismissed or 
negotiated on terms favorable to the defense. If the prosecution suc-
cessfully resists the motion to suppress, the defendant may have lit-
tle hope of success at trial (especially where a confession is in issue), 
with the result that the likelihood of a guilty plea is substantially 
increased.128 
Justice Blackmun recognized, however, that occasions could arise in 
which the needs of the media would conflict with the needs of the defen-
dant. He stated that the public might be excluded from "portions of the 
proceeding at which the prejudicial information would be disclosed,"129 
but that a record of the in camera proceedings should be available to 
the public "as soon as the threat to the defendant's fair-trial right has 
passed."130 The dissenters gave a short answer to the question raised by 
1
"" Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., concurring & dissenting in part). The opinion also stated: 
The sixth amendment speaks in terms of the right of the accused to a public 
trial, but this right does not belong solely to the accused to assert or forego 
as he or she desires .... The defendant's interest, primarily is to ensure fair 
treatment in his or her particular case. While the public's more generalized 
interest in open trials includes a concern for justice to individual defendants, 
it goes beyond that. The transcendent reason for public trials is to ensure 
efficiency, competence, and integrity in the overall operation of the judicial 
system. Thus, the defendant's willingness to waive the right to a public trial 
in a criminal case cannot be the deciding factor .... It is just as important 
to the public to guard against undue favoritism or leniency as to guard against 
undue harshness or discrimination. 
ld. at 433 n.13 (quoting ABA STANDARDSFORCRIMINALJUSTICE,FAIRTRIALANDFREEPRESS, 
Standard 8-3.2 at 15 (Approved Draft 1978)). 
127 443 U.S. at 433 (Blackmun, J., concurring & dissenting in part). The dissenters em-
phasized that they did not reach the first amendment issue in the case. Id. at 447. 
128 ld. at 434. 
129 Id. at 445. 
130 Id. 
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Justice Stewart at the start of the majority opinion: There is an indepen-
dent constitutional right to insist upon access unless there is a substan-
tial probability that an open hearing would result in harm to the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial. The dissenters, however, could find no such 
substantial probability in this case: "The coverage in petitioner's 
newspapers ... was circumspect .... All coverage ceased on August 
6 and did not resume until after the suppression hearing three months 
later. The stories that appeared were largely factual in nature .... And 
petitioner's newspapers had only a small circulation in [the county]."131 
The conclusions to be drawn from Gannett are varied, to say the least. 
One could argue effectively that the media was the big loser in the 
Supreme Court. All nine Justices assumed without question that the media 
had no absolute right to demand that pretrial proceedings be kept open. 
Utilizing the balancing t~st of weighing the fair trial interest against the 
open access interest, five members of the Court132 found that the peti-
tioner in this case could not expect an open proceeding. This conclusion 
is particularly unfortunate for two reasons: first, as indicated in the dis-
senting opinion, the conduct of the media representatives was hardly 
egregious.133 It is not clear that alternatives would have failed or that 
closure was necessary in light of the relatively calm and responsible report-
ing concerning the case. Second, the majority refused to confront the fact 
that in the vast majority of criminal proceedings there is no trial, making 
the reporting of important pretrial proceedings crucial. The Chief Justice 
remarked that "[s]omething in the neighborhood of 85 percent of all 
criminal charges are resolved by guilty pleas,"134 a figure which has been 
consistently supported by research in the area.135 Even in those cases which 
are not resolved by guilty pleas, pretrial proceedings are often dispositive. 
As Justice Powell observed in his concurring opinion, because suppres-
sion hearings may determine the outcome of the case, "the public's in-
terest in this proceeding often is comparable to its interest in the trial 
itself."136 
Most distressing to some journalists was the reluctance of the Justices 
131 Id. at 446-48. 
132 The Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. See id. at 
378·91, 394, 397·98, 403. 
133 See note 131 & accompanying text supra. 
134 443 U.S. at 397 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
133 In the county in which the trial took place, every felony prosecution for the year 
1976 was terminated without a trial on the merits. Id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., concurring 
& dissenting in part). The statistics cited by Justice Blackmun are particularly striking: 
In the year 1976 in the Supreme Court for the City of New York, almost 90% of all criminal 
cases were terminated by dismissal or by a plea of guilty. In the trial courts outside New 
York City the percentage was even higher. Id. at 435 n.14. See generally NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AD-
MINISTRATION, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES, app. A (1978). 
1
'"' 443 U.S. at 397 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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to consider seriously the first amendment claim for access to pretrial pro-
ceedings. Only Justices Powell and Rehnquist discussed the issue at length, 
and only Justice Powell thought that there was some merit to the first 
amendment assertion. 
The result in Gannett, then, is hardly cause for media celebration. There 
is, however, another side to the analysis. There is some indication that 
if a proper constitutional claim had been made, five Justices might have 
agreed with the media access contention in this particular case. Justice 
Powell pointed out that "although I disagree with my four dissenting 
Brethren concerning the origin and the scope of the constitutional limita-
tions on the closing of pretrial proceedings, I agree with their conclusion 
that there are limitations and that they require the careful attention of 
trial courts before closure can be ordered."137 
In spite of the serious claims of harm made in Gannett, in the vast ma-
jority of cases the pretrial publicity issue is not troublesome.138 Even in 
those unusual cases where the question is at issue, it appears that judges 
are likely to be cautious before imposing closure orders. The American 
Bar Association position is that closure should only be ordered upon 
findings that "[1] the dissemination of information from the hearing would 
pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and [2] the 
prejudicial effect of such information on the jurors cannot be avoided by 
any reasonable alternative means."139 Even the lesser standard suggested 
in the proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would allow closure 
only if "[1] there is a reasonable likelihood that dissemination of informa-
tion from the proceeding would interfere with defendant's right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury; and [2] the prejudicial effect of such informa-
tion on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any reasonable alternative 
means."140 
137 Id. at 398 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). But see Justice Rehnquist's opinion: 
I do not so lightly as my Brother Powell impute to the four dissenters in this 
case a willingness to ignore the doctrine of stare decisis and to join with him 
in some later decision to form what might fairly be called an 'odd quintuplet,' 
agreeing that the authority of trial courts to close judicial proceedings to the 
public is subject to limitations stemming from two different sources in the 
Constitution. 
Id. at 405-06 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
138 But see Franklin, Untested Assumptions and Unanswered Questions, 29 STAN. L. REv. 
387, 391 (1977). 
139 2 ABA STANDARDS FoR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, supra note 94, 
at Standard 8-3.6(d). 
140 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
91 F.R.D. 289, 365-67 (1982) (proposed rule 43.1). See also Reuised Report of the Judicial 
Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" 
Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519 (1980). The more stringent ABA Standard is the same substantive 
test as used in Nebraska Press. The test was considered and rejected by the Federal Rules 
Advisory Committee because " 'there is a crucial difference between imposing prior restraints 
against the press on the one hand and the denial of access to news sources on the other,' 
and because a 'clear and present danger' test would be impractical in this setting and un-
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The situation immediately after the Court's decision in Gannett was 
unsettled and unsettling.141 The Court had allowed a closure order in that 
pretrial proceeding, thus giving support to the defense position that 
closures were generally proper.142 Gannett, though, had involved a very 
specific fact situation, a closure order in a narrow pretrial proceeding. 
What about closure orders in other proceedings143 or in the trial itself?144 
The Supreme Court, just one year to the day after Gannett was decided, 
shed light on this last question in Richrrwnd Nwspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 145 
The criminal defendant in Richmond Nwspapers was tried for murder 
four times over a two-year period.146 At the fourth trial, counsel for the 
defendant moved that the trial be closed to the public due to a fear that 
testimony would be recounted to witnesses during the course of the pro-
ceedings. The district attorney made no objection to the motion. Pursuant 
to statute/47 the judge ordered the trial closed after accepting the defense 
counsel's argument and finding that "'having people in the Courtroom 
is distracting to the jury.' "148 Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices 
White and Stevens, began the plurality opinion by noting that the issue 
in the instant case had never been decided by the Court, thereby 
distinguishing Gannett.149 When the question was framed by the Chief 
Justice, its answer was clearly suggested: 
necessary where the only consequence is deferral of public knowledge of the matters oc-
curring during closure." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 372 (1982) (quoting 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, at Standard 8-3.2 note (2d ed. 1980)). 
141 Within a year after the decision, over 150 proceedings were ordered closed, including 
34 trials. Comment, The Public's Right to Access Versus the Right to a Fair Trial: A Balanc-
ing Compromise, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 191, 193 n.22 (1981) . 
• "
2 See generally Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430,448-49, 
399 N.E.2d 518, 528-29, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 641-42 (1979) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring). 
"
3 For consideration of other hearings, see In re Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation, 
508 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va.1980) (immunity hearings), and Rapid City Journal Co. v. Circuit 
Court, 283 N.W .2d 563 (S.D. 1979) (voir dire hearings). With respect to post-trial proceedings, 
see United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d 825 (lOth Cir. 1981). The Proposed Federal Rules 
contend that "there is no justification for extending the rule to [post-trial] proceedings." 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
supra note 140, at 369. 
'" "[T]he Court [in Gannett] spoke no less than twelve times of a general public right 
of access to criminal trials." Boyd & Lehrman, When, If Ever, Should Trials be Held Behind 
Closed Doors?, 5 NovA L.J.l, 1 (1980). 
lOS 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
"" In the first trial evidence was improperly obtained; the second and third trials ended 
in mistrials. Id. at 559. 
"
1 In t~e trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor 
cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose 
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of 
the accused to a public trial shall not be violated. 
VA. CODE S 19.2-266 (Supp. 1981). 
"" 448 U.S. at 561 (plurality opinion). 
"" Id. at 563-64. "In [Gannett], the Court was not required to decide whether a right 
of access to trials, as distinguished from hearings on pretrial motions, was constitutionally 
guaranteed." Id. at 564 (emphasis in original). 
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But here for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a 
criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed 
request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is re-
quired to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that 
some other overriding consideration requires closure.15Q 
After tracing the origins of the criminal trial, the Chief Justice noted 
that "[w]hat is significant for present purposes is that throughout its evolu-
tion, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe."151 The opinion 
emphasized that open access to criminal trials serves the public interest 
because "the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic 
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and 
emotion,"152 and ·because awareness that society is responding to crime 
reduces the probability that the public will take the law into its own 
hands.153 The difficulty here, as in Gannett, was that neither the Constitu-
tion nor the Bill of Rights contains any provision which expressly 
guarantees the public or the media the right to attend criminal trials. 
Nevertheless, in construing the first amendment, the Chief Justice wrote 
that it could be read as "protecting the right of everyone to attend trials 
so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees. . . . The explicit, 
guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place 
at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could, 
as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily."154 For the tJu:ee Justices, "without 
the freedom to attend [criminal] trials, which people have exercised for 
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could 
be eviscerated.' "155 
The Justices pointed out that the first amendment interest was not 
absolute, 156 and that the trial must remain open to the public and the press 
"[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings .... "157 Here, 
150 I d.; see Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
411 (1977). 
151 448 U.S. at 564 (plurality opinion). 
152 Id. at 571. 
153 Id. 
150 Id. at 575-77. The plurality noted other rights implicit in the Constitution, such as 
"the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent, and the right 
to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial. ... " 
Id. at 579-80. 
155 Id. at 580. See also Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("One of the demands of a democratic 
society is that the public should know what goes on in courts by being told by .the press 
what happens there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of criminal 
justice is fair and right."). 
156 Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions upon the use of its streets in the interest of such objectives as the free 
flow of traffic ... , so may a trial judge, in the interest of the fair administra-
tion of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial. 
448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
157 Id. at 581. 
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"the trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made 
as to whether alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure 
fairness; there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution 
for the public or press to attend the trial."158 
Justice Stevens concurred, primarily to explain the importance of the 
case:l59 
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually 
absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but 
never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy 
matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever .... 
Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that 
an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an 
abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by 
the First Amendment.160 
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall explored 
the rationale for the Court's ruling requiring open access. They 
particularly stressed the unique role of the media to carry forth such 
policies: "[T]he institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary 
of a right of access because it serves as the 'agent' of interested citizens, 
and funnels information about trials to a large number of individuals."161 
Justice Stewart wrote separately to emphasize that while a first amend-
ment right existed in the press and the public with respect to access to 
criminal trials, such a right had to be weighed against the interests of 
the criminal defenda-nt. In this case, he found that the trial judge had 
"given no recognition" to the rights of the press and the public to be 
present at trial.162 In other cases, he would grant considerable discretion 
to the trial judge. Denying that the right of access was absolute, Justice 
Stewart said that "a trial judge [may] impose reasonable limitations upon 
the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press 
and members of the public."163 Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result, 
would have relied primarily on the sixth amendment right to a public 
triaJ.l64 
Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Analyzing the language and origins 
of the first, sixth, fourteenth, and ninth amendments, he was unable to 
find any provision of the Constitution which prohibited the closure of a 
154 Id. at 580-81. 
1
•• Justice Stevens also explained his view, as originally set forth in Houchins v. KQED, 
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19-40 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), as to why access to information should 
be given considerable leeway in a nontrial setting. 448 U.S. at 583-84 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
100 448 U.S. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
101 Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White also concurred to reiterate his 
view in Gannett that the sixth amendment should be construed to forbid the general clos-
ing of criminal proceedings. Id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring). 
let Id. at 599-601 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
103 Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
104 Id. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
262 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:235 
triaJ.l65 He also attacked the Court's general willingness to concentrate 
in itself so much power over the control of the criminal justice system. 
Justice Rehnquist objected to the Court's assuming "ultimate decision-
making power over how justice shall be administered, not merely in the 
federal system but in each of the 50 States."166 Nine persons should not 
exercise such authority over 220 million people.167 
What is on~ to make of Richmond Newspapers with its seven separate 
opinions, none commanding more than three members of the Court? While 
questions concerning the legal bounds of the holding may be legitimately 
raised, the case is a major victory for the media. Eight members of the 
Court have explicitly recognized a first amendment right of access for 
the public and the press in connection with the criminal trial.166 The broad 
language in the various opinions shows a judiciary most sympathetic to 
media claims.169 All members of the Court who supported the first amend-
ment argument concluded that the first amendment right of the press 
and public was not absolute, but had to be balanced on a case-by-case 
basis against the defendant's interest in a trial free from bias. Never-
theless, in order to satisfy the Supreme Court, a judge who orders closure 
of a trial will have to demonstrate, at a minimum, the existence of a 
genuine potential for prejudice, the effectiveness of a closure order in 
eliminating that threat, and the unavailability of alternatives in doing soP0 
While the media were big winners in the Supreme Court in connection 
with the open access to the trial itself, it is less clear what impact, if 
any, Richmond Newspapers will have beyond the trial. Most of the Justices 
'
05 Id. at 605-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
at 403..()6 (Rehnquist, J ., concurring). 
, .. 448 U.S. at 606 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
'"
7 Id. 
106 Justice Powell did not participate in Richmond Newspapers. I d. at 581. However, his 
opinion in Gannett leaves little doubt as to his position concerning the first amendment 
argument. See note 120 & accompanying text supra. 
'" The various discussions call to mind the argument made by journalist Carl Stern in 
response to a claim that a controversial trial should not be kept open. 
I remember another case recently in suburban Washington where a judge 
closed a courtroom in which three men were being tried for sex offenses against 
two girls on the grounds that the men were modestly high government 
employees whose work for the government would be embarrassed and their 
performance for the taxpayers made more difficult if there was extensive 
publicity about the case. Well, that's too bad. I can't think of a better deter-
rent to that type of conduct .... 
Stern, supra note 99, at 357. For an opinion echoing the sentiments expressed in the Rich-
mond Newspapers opinions, see Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 
430, 445, 399 N.E.2d 518, 526, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 639 (1979) (Cooke, C.J., concurring). 
170 Comment supra note 141, at 202; Comment, First ATnend1nent-Constitutional Right 
of Access to Criminal Trials, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547, 557 (1980). See generally Hale, 
Attitudes of Media Attorneys Concerning Criminal Proceedings, 3 CoM. & L. 3 (1981). 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Richmond Newspapers by striking down 
the state statute in Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982). 
Massachusetts law is unique in the country; by statute judges are required to close the 
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in their separate opinions stated that this case was to be distinguished 
from Gannett because Richmond Newspapers involved a trial while Gan-
nett did not.171 Nevertheless, the broad language throughout the opinions 
has made some commentators wonder whether Richmond Newspapers was 
decided by the Court in order to "reconsider Gannett,"112 whether the Court 
took the case "in order to clarify the earlier decision,"173 or whether it 
was intended to have "any impact at all on the Gannett decision."174 
However, there has already been considerable impact in the nontrial set-
ting. Some courts have gone beyond Richmond Newspapers in holding first 
amendment considerations applicable to aspects of proceedings which could 
courtroom to the press and the public when a sex crime victim under the age of 18 is 
testifying. In other states, judges may exercise their discretion in such cases. In the trial 
at issue, neither the prosecution nor the government requested closure. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld this portion of the statute, as well as a provision giving 
the judge discretion to close the entire trial: 
The plaintiff says that a balancing of State interests against First Amend-
ment rights is permissible only if undertaken on a case-by-case basis. We do 
not agree. We perceive no such holding in Richrrwnd Newspapers . ... [B]y 
their very nature, these substantial State interests would be defeated if a 
case-by-case determination were used. Ascertaining the susceptibility of an 
individual victim might require expert testimony and would be a cumbersome 
process at best ..•. To the extent that such a hearing is effective, requiring 
various psychological examinations in some depth, the victim will be forced 
to relive the experience. 
__Mass. at __ , 423 N-E.2d at 779-80. The media argument on appeal was that "no por-
tion of the trial should be closed without a hearing at which the judge must ascertain 
that the reasons for the closing are 'tangible and substantial' and that the young victim's 
interest cannot otherwise be adequately protected." Greenhouse, Law Closing Testimony 
in Sex Case Faces Test, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1981, § A, at 11, col. 1. 
While there is considerable force behind the statutory policy, and while a closure order 
will be proper in many such cases, the Court in a 6-3 decision (the Chief Justice and Justices 
Rehnquist and Stevens dissenting) found that the statute conflicted irreconcilably with 
the holding in Richrrwnd Newspapers. 102 S. Ct. at 2622-23, 2627. The Court in Richmond 
Newspapers stressed the first amendment interests in keeping important criminal trials 
open. It required "an overriding interest articulated in findings" before closure would be 
proper. A blanket closure rule in all cases in which minor victims testify conflicts with 
this principle. I d. at 2620-22. As stated by Justice Brennan for the Globe Newspapers ma-
jority, "[The state's interest] could be served just as well by requiring the trial court to 
determine on a case-by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the well-being 
of the minor victim necessitates closure." Id. at 2621. 
171 See, e.g., 448 U.S. at 563-64 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens found that "[t]he absence 
of any articulated reason for the closure order" distinguished Richrrwnd Newspapers from 
Gannett. Id. at 584 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
172 Boyd & Lehrman, supra note 144, at 2. 
173 Comment, supra note 141, at 194. 
m The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 77, 156 n.42 (1980). The commentator 
stated: 
I d. 
It is much less certain whether Richrrwnd Newspapers extends a first amend-
ment right of access to the pretrial context. In Gannett, the Court rejected 
the analogical argument that the sixth amendment policies justifying open 
trials should justify access to pretrial proceedings; the impact of Richrrwnd 
Newspapers' first amendment ruling upon pretrial closures thus remains 
undetermined. 
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be termed nontrial.175 The tone of the opinions in Richmond Newspapers 
has influenced trial judges who apply a much closer scrutiny to closure 
requests than ever before.176 
The Richmond Newspapers case, for all its uncertainty, for all the ques-
tions concerning its potential impact, can properly be labeled as the 
Supreme Court's "most ringing endorsement of the press and public's 
right of access to government under the First Amendment."177 Indeed, 
as counsel for the newspapers stated, " '[t]he fact is the Court has taken 
as large a leap in the First Amendment area as it has in the last quarter 
century.' "178 This leap was significant and entirely justified, for the closure 
175 Consider, for example, the attempt by one district judge to close portions of voir 
dire examination of jurors and to examine veniremen individually in chambers. The court 
of appeals frowned upon this type of closed activity in In reUnited States ex rel. Pulitzer 
Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1980). The court explained: 
Our sole reason for granting the writ in this case is based on the failure 
of the district judge to announce his reasons for the decision to close the voir 
dire proceedings and for his failure to balance the right of the public to at-
tend the trial against the right of the defendant to a fair trial in accordance 
with the principles announced in [Richmond Newspapers]. 
Id. See also a decision to label a juvenile delinquency proceeding a "criminal trial" under 
Richmond Newspapers, holding that the press had a first amendment right to attend such 
sessions absent unusual circumstances. In re certain Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 
[1981] 29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2248. 
176 In Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Florida, 378 So. 2d 862, 864~5 (Dist. Ct. App. 1980), 
rev'd, 395 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1981), the court found that two witnesses' fear of retaliation 
for testifying was insufficient cause to exclude the press without specific supporting infor-
mation. But see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, ___Mass. __ , 423 N.E.2d 773 
(1981) (statute requiring closure during testimony of minor complainants in sexual assault 
cases constitutional). As indicated previously, see note 170 supra, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed in Globe Newspaper. 
177 Comment, supra note 101. This is especially clear when Richmond Newspapers is con-
trasted with the prison access cases, see note 124 supra. 
178 Comment, supra note 177, at 947. Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe argued 
the case. Id. Professor Tribe's enthusiasm ought not to be unrestrained, however. Under 
the Supreme Court's ruling, trials still may be closed in special cases, see Sacramento Bee 
v. United States Dist. Court, 656 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1981); and, of course, the case does 
not overrule Gannett, thus allowing closures quite readily in pretrial matters, see Federated 
Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981) (reporters could be ex-
cluded from suppression hearings in "Hillside Strangler" case if they refused to sign agree-
ment to abide by state's bar/bench/press guidelines). As indicated in note 175 & accompany-
ing text supra, however, it cannot be doubted that Richmond Newspapers has had con-
siderable impact, even on the pretrial situation ostensibly covered by Gannett. This point 
was well made in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Chappell, 403 So. 2d 1342, 1344 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1981), where the court refused to close a pretrial competency hearing. On appeal 
the judges adopted a three-part test to review closure orders: 
[T]he public may be denied access ... only if the movant proves that: (1) 
closure is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the administra-
tion of justice, (2) no less restrictive alternative measure is available, and (3) 
closure will in fact achieve the court's purpose .... The first prong of the 
test protects a defendant's right to a fair trial; the second prong employs tradi-
tional First Amendment techniques, and the third prong employs practical 
considerations. Because the test protects competing societal interests in pro-
viding fair trials while permitting free access to courts, we adopt its criteria. 
Id. at 1345 (citations omitted). 
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order poses a great threat to the free dissemination of information about 
unquestionably newsworthy events. In that sense, it parallels the prior 
restraint conflict in Nebraska Press. In both cases the press would not 
be allowed to report newsworthy events, in the former case, by a court 
order of prohibition, and in the latter case, by a court order cutting off 
the source of information. The only real question to be raised as a matter 
of policy in Richmond Newspapers is why the Court did not take the op-
portunity to overrule or at least seriously cut back the shortsighted 
holding in Gannett. 
B. The Privacy and Rehabilitation Interests 
To this point this article has examined cases in which the reporting 
of criminal trials has arguably conflicted with only one interest, that of 
the defendant under the sixth amendment to receive a fair trial before 
an unbiased jury. Apart from the trial and pretrial publicity conflicts, 
other interests may surface when there is media coverage of a criminal 
trial. Of great concern in this area are questions involving the privacy 
and rehabilitation of offenders.179 One of the most famous cases in the 
area, Melvin v. Reid/80 illustrates these interests. The plaintiff was a 
former prostitute who had been tried for murder. The murder trial was 
widely reported, but she was acquitted. After the trial, she married and 
became, according to the court, "entirely rehabilitated."181 Seven years 
after the trial, the movie "The Red Kimono" was made; in the film the 
plaintiffs former life was set out in some detail. Included in the film were 
the facts of the murder charge and trial as well as the plaintiffs name.182 
The California court recognized the press and public interest generally 
in access to such information: 
[T]he use of the incidents from the life of appellant in the moving 
picture is in itself not actionable. These incidents appeared in the 
records of her trial for murder, which is a public record, open to the 
perusal of all. The very fact that they were contained in a public record 
is sufficient to negative the idea that their publication was a violation 
of a right of privacy. When the incidents of a life are so public as 
to be spread upon a public record, they come within the knowledge 
and into the possession of the public and cease to be private.183 
The public interest, however, did not incll}de the need to know the plain-
tiffs name because it was not newsworthy. In addition, the use of the 
179 The problem of televising criminal proceedings raises all three issues: privacy con-
cerns, questions of rehabilitation, and issues surrounding the unbiased jury. See notes 243-96 
& accompanying text infra. 
160 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). 
181 Id. at 286, 297 P. at 91. 
182 Id. at 287, 297 P. at 91. 
183 Id. at 290, 297 P. at 93. 
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name tended to jeopardize society's efforts to rehabilitate convicted 
criminals:184 
One of the major objectives of society as it is now constituted, and 
of the administration of our penal system, is the rehabilitation of the 
fallen and the reformation of the criminal. Under these theories of 
sociology, it is our object to lift up and sustain the unfortunate rather 
than tear him down. Where a person has by his own efforts 
rehabilitated himself, we, as right-thinking members of society, should 
permit him to continue in the path of rectitude rather than throw 
him back into a life of shame or crime. Even the thief on the cross 
was permitted to repent during the hours of his final agony.185 
The court allowed a civil action by the plaintiff against the producers.186 
The "Red Kimono" case was relied on in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest 
Association, 187 a thoughtful opinion written by the California Supreme 
Court forty years later. The plaintiff had been convicted in 1956 of truck 
hijacking. Immediately thereafter he became rehabilitated. The defendant 
published an article discussing truck hijacking. The article referred to 
the plaintiff and the conviction, but not to the fact that the hijacking had 
occurred eleven years earlier. The court found that as a "result of the 
defendant's publication, plaintiff's 11-year-old daughter, as well as his 
friends, for the first time learned of this incident. They thereafter scorned 
and abandoned him."186 
The facts in Briscoe put the question at issue. In a situation in which 
the basic story was newsworthy, 189 how would the interest in the 
dissemination of information balance against the objective of rehabilitating 
felons and the interest in the felon's privacy after he had been 
rehabilitated? The court acknowledged the important interest in repor-
ting crimes and judicial proceedings and even in identifying persons cur-
rently charged with crimes.190 The reports of past crimes and the iden-
tification of past defendants were different matters. 
[I]dentification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serves 
little independent public purpose. Once legal proceedings have ter-
minated, and a suspect or offender has been released, identification 
1 
.. See id. at 290-91, 297 P. at 93. 
185 Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93. 
186 Though at the time it was not clear that there was a cause of action denominated 
privacy, the court was willing to allow the claim to go forward no matter what the label 
given to it. Id. at 292, 29i P. at 93-94. 
187 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971). 
188 Id. at 533, 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868. 
188 There was little question raised by the court that this was a legitimate newsworthy 
story involving substantial public issues. The plaintiff himself conceded that the basic sub-
ject of the article "may have been 'newsworthy.'" I d. 
190 There can be no doubt that reports of current criminal activities are the 
legitimate province of a free press. The circumstances under which crimes 
occur, the techniques used by those outside the law, the tragedy that may 
befall the victims- these are vital bits of information for people coping with 
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of the individual will not usually aid the administration of justice. Iden-
tification will no longer serve to bring forth witnesses or obtain suc-
cor for victims. Unless the individual has reattracted the public eye 
to himself in some independent fashion, the only public "interest" that 
would usually be served is that of curiosity.191 
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The court went on to state that "the state has a compelling interest in 
the efficacy of penal systems in rehabilitating criminals .... A jury might 
well find that a continuing threat that the rehabilitated offender's old 
identity will be resurrected by the media is counter-productive to the 
goals of this correctional process."192 
A wide-ranging balancing test was adopted in Briscoe to determine 
whether the plaintiffs privacy action would lie. He would have to show 
that the publication was not newsworthy and that it revealed facts so 
offensive as to shock the community's notions of decency.193 The case was 
remanded to the trial court to decide 
(1) whether plaintiff had become a rehabilitated member of society, 
(2) whether identifying him as a former criminal would be highly of-
fensive and injurious to the reasonable man, (3) whether defendant 
published this information with a reckless disregard for its offen-
siveness, and (4) whether any independent justification for printing 
plaintiffs identity existed.194 
Melvin and Briscoe, taken together, represent an important line of cases 
because they demonstrate an awareness by the judiciary of the balance 
involved in the privacy and rehabilitation cases. On the one hand, many 
the exigencies of modern life. Reports of these events may also promote the 
values served by the constitutional guarantee of a public trial. Although a 
case is not to be "tried in the papers," reports regarding a crime or criminal 
proceedings may encourage unknown witnesses to come forward with useful 
testimony and friends or relatives to come to the aid of the victim. 
It is also generally in the social interest to identify adults currently charged 
with the commission of a crime. While such an identification may not presume 
guilt, it may legitimately put others on notice that the named individual is 
suspected of having committed a crime. Naming the suspect may also per-
suade eye witnesses and character witnesses to testify. For these reasons, 
while the suspect or offender obviously does not consent to public exposure, 
his right to privacy must give way to the overriding social interest. 
Id. at 536, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (footnote omitted). 
191 Id. at 537, 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (emphasis in original). 
192 Id. at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875. 
193 Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 42-43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75. 
19
' Id. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Commentators generally applauded 
Briscoe. See Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Puhlic Disclosure Actions, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV.180, 199 (1977); Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and First Amend-
ment Rights in Public Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV.1385, 1392, 1399 (1976). But see 
Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 608 P .2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1980), where the California 
Supreme Court noted that the courts in California have refrained from extending the Briscoe 
rule to other cases: "Our decision in Briscoe was an exception to the more general rule 
that 'once a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate 
recall to the public mind to the end of his days.'" Id. at 811, 608 P.2d at 726, 163 Cal. 
Rptr. at 638 (quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 418 (1960)). 
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of these cases, particularly cases dealing with reporting of recent events, 
involve especially newsworthy activities and should be given considerable 
deference under the first amendment.195 On the other hand, questions must 
be raised as to whether such deference should be given when the event 
is not current or identification of an individual adds little to the newswor-
thiness of the story but could adversely affect important privacy and 
rehabilitation interests.196 The California courts seem to have struck the 
correct balance in dealing with these important concerns. These cases 
contrast with several cases recently decided by the Supreme Court in 
which the Court spent little time analyzing the rehabilitation and privacy 
interests and instead focused almost exclusively on first amendment 
objectives. 
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn/91 the privacy interest was para-
mount. The plaintiffs teenaged daughter was the victim of a rape who 
died during the incident. Six teenagers were indicted for both the murder 
and the rape. There was substantial media coverage of the incident and 
the trial, but the identity of the victim was not disclosed prior to trial. 
At the time the trial court accepted the guilty pleas, the defendant broad-
casting company named the victim in a news report describing the court 
proceedings. Claiming an invasion of privacy, the father of the victim sued 
the defendants for money damages.198 During the course of the civil pro-
ceedings, all parties conceded that the defendants had learned the name 
of the victim from an examination of the indictments which were available 
for inspection by the public in the courtroom.199 The state trial court found 
that the defendant's broadcasting was in violation of a state statute which 
made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of 
a rape vicitim.200 
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that the 
first amendment, as a matter of constitutional law, required judgment 
for the defendant. The court agreed that the criminal proceedings were 
matters of public concern. The court disagreed with the broader media 
argument, concluding instead that there was "no public interest or general 
concern about the identity of the victim of such a crime as will make 
19
• 4 Cal. 3d at 537, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871. 
196 It is quite difficult to articulate the strong first amendment interest involved in 
publishing the plaintiffs name in Briscoe, rather than merely describing the events. 
197 420 u.s. 469 (1975). 
198 Id. at 471·75. Considerable question was raised as to whether, apart from constitu· 
tiona! claims, there existed a right of privacy in the plaintiff for disclosure of the name 
of the deceased daughter. The trial judge held that the Georgia statute gave a civil remedy 
to the plaintiff. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court's ruling was in error 
but found that the common law tort of public disclosure allowed for an invasion of privacy 
claim. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 61-62, 200 S.E.2d 127, 129-30 (1973), 
rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
199 420 u.s. 469, 472-73 (1975). 
200 Id. at 471 n.1 (citing GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972)). 
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the right to qisclose the identity of the victim rise to the level of First 
Amendment protection."201 
Looking to the injury involved in the case, public disclosure of private 
facts, the United States Supreme Court chose to construe the issue nar-
rowly: "whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publica-
tion of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records-more 
specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in connection with 
a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection."202 
The Court relied heavily on the media defendant's role in reporting the 
criminal trial proceedings. The Court reasoned that individuals have 
limited opportunities to see the government at work and that the media's 
reporting of governmental proceedings is a service without which many 
citizens and their representatives "would be unable to vote intelligently 
or to register opinions on the administration of government generally. 
With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press 
serves to guarantee the fairness of trials .... "203 Justice White, writing 
for the majority, rejected plaintiffs claim "that the efforts of the press 
have infringed his right to privacy by broadcasting to the world the fact 
that his daughter was a rape victim."204 He explained: "The commission 
of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising 
from the prosecutions ..• are without question events of legitimate con-
cern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the 
press to report the"eperations of government."205 In reversing the Georgia 
courts, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the infor-
mation in this case had been placed in the public domain as official court 
records.206 The Court gave virtually no consideration to the privacy in-
terests claimed by the family of the rape and murder victim: "Once true 
information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspec-
201 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 68, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1973), rev'd, 420 
U.S. 469 (1975). The court relied heavily on the Briscoe case. Interestingly enough, in Briscoe 
the California Supreme Court said that the disclosure of the names of suspects in connec-
tion with recent crimes would generally be protected by the first amendment. 4 Cal. 3d 
at 537, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871. However, the court pointed out that the media 
would not necessarily have an "unmitigated right" to publish the identity of offenders or 
victims, relying on numerous statutes which prohibited the disclosure of the name of the 
rape victims in news reports, including the Georgia statute at issue in the Cox Broadcasting 
case. Id. at 537 n.10, 483 P.2d at 39 n.10, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871 n.10. 
,... 420 U.S. at 491. 
203 Id. at 492 . 
... Id. 
20s Id. 
,.. ld. at 495. The Court was almost unanimous in its holding. Chief Justice Burger con-
curred in the judgment and Justices Powell and Douglas wrote concurring opinions focus-
ing more generally on the first amendment issues with respect to public figures and public 
affairs. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented; his dissent was limited to the question of whether 
the decision which was the subject of the appeal was a final judgment or decree under 
28 U.S.C. S 1257 (Supp. IV 1974). Id. at 501. 
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tion, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it. In this instance 
as in others reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide 
what to publish or broadcast."207 
The Supreme Court chose not to deal with the issues raised in Briscoe 
as well as in the Georgia courts' disposition in Cox Broadcasting. Although 
in many instances society needs to rely upon the judgment of those who 
decide what to publish or broadcast, it is not clear that the rape victim's 
disclosure case is such an instance. As the court in Briscoe pointed out, 
there is necessarily a delicate balance between the interests of free 
dissemination of information on the one side and preservation of privacy 
and rehabilitation interests on the other. Even more to the point is the 
conclusion reached by the Georgia Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting: 
There is "no public interest or general concern about the identity of the 
victim of such a crime as will make the right to disclose the identity of 
the victim rise to the level of First Amendment protection."208 No doubt 
the incident is newsworthy and the trial is newsworthy, but what is the 
public interest in the identity of the victim or the victim's family? Unfor-
tunately, the Court did little to respond to this question.209 The Justices 
simply concluded that publication of truthful information contained in of-
ficial court records open to public inspection cannot be the subject of 
criminal sanction under the first and fourteenth amendments.210 
207 Id. at 496. 
208 231 Ga. 60, 68, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
209 A number of the cases following Cox Broadcasting also chose to ignore the question. 
In McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980), the court, acknowledg-
ing the holding in Melvin v. Reid, rejected it: " 'There is no liability for giving publicity 
to facts about the plaintiffs life which [sic] are matters of public record.'" I d. at 742 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 D, Comment b (1977)). See also Moloney v. Tribune 
Publishing Co., 26 Wash. App. 357, 363, 613 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1980) ("If the report of an 
official public action or proceeding is accurate or a fair abridgement, an action cannot con-
stitutionally be maintained, either for defamation or for invasion of the right to privacy."). 
As broadly stated in WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420, 427 (6th Cir. 1981): "[The statute] 
represents a legislative determination that in every case involving certain sex offenses, 
there exists a sufficiently serious and imminent threat to the privacy interests of the per-
sons involved to justify a suppression order. Deference to such legislative judgments is impos-
sible when First Amendment rights are at stake.'' 
210 The holding was strongly criticized: 
Buttressing the result dictated by its first two grounds of decision, the Court 
argued that, as recognized by the common law public records defense to a 
privacy action, there is no substantial privacy interest in information already 
on the public record. Although the Court was less than explicit, the argu-
ment seems to be that because no legitimate privacy interests are infringed 
by giving publicity to public information, it is unconstitutional to impose sanc-
tions on the press for printing such information regardless of its importance. 
This argument rests on a false premise. Although it is true that a public 
disclosure action lies only if the facts disclosed are not widely known, it is 
disingenuous to suggest that all facts on the public record are public facts, 
in the sense that they are known to a substantial number of people. Giving 
publicity to little-known facts in the public record may appreciably affect in-
dividual privacy. 
Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, supra note 194, at 
189-90 (footnotes omitted). 
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By emphasizing the public nature of the trial and the public access to 
the court records in Cox Broadcasting, the Court left important questions 
open. The question was soon raised as to the result in cases in which 
there were state policies not allowing access by either the public or the 
press to various kinds of official records. Soon, too, the Court was con-
fronted with cases involving proceedings which had traditionally been 
closed to the public, such as juvenile delinquency matters. Moreover, jour-
nalists asked what the impact of Cox Broadcasting would be when facts 
were found due to the independent investigation of the journalists rather 
than the availability of public records. The Court quickly answered these 
questions in a way which did little to displease the media defendants. 
In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,211 the Supreme Court, in 
a short per curiam opinion, relied heavily upon the decisions in Cox 
Publishing and Nebraska Press. The state trial judge had enjoined 
members of the news media from "'publishing, broadcasting, or 
disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture of [a] minor child' in 
connection with a juvenile proceeding involving that child then pending 
•••• "
212 The reporters for the defendant's newspapers had been in the 
courtroom during an open hearing on a detention petition in connection 
with a murder case. The newspaper obtained the eleven-year-old delin-
quent's name and·picture. Thereafter, the trial judge entered the order, 
and the media petitioners moved to quash.213 The Court held that under 
the first amendment the state judge could not "prohibit the publication 
of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which 
were in fact open to the public."214 
The Oklahoma case was an easy one. While the state statute provided 
for closed juvenile hearings, members of the press were present at the 
hearing with the full knowledge of the judge, the prosecutor, and the 
juvenile's lawyer. The media representatives had thus obtained the in-
formation lawfully and with the state's implicit approval.215 Consequently, 
the Court quickly found that Cox Broadcasting required the result, without 
having to fo~us on the purposes which could be served by closed pro-
ceedings. Just one year later, however, the Court had before it a case 
in which the proceedings could be closed under state statute and were 
closed during the reporting of the incident. 
The Virginia State Constitution216 and statutes217 prohibited the 
211 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). 
212 Id. at 308 (quoting pretrial order entered by Dist. Court, Okla. County). 
213 Id. at 309. 
2
" Id. at 310. 
215 Id. at 311. 
218 VA. CoNST. art. VI, S 10, quoted in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 
829, 830 n.1 (1978). 
"
7 VA. CODE S 2.1-37.13 (1973), quoted in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 
U.S. 829, 830 n.1 (1978); see Judicial Inquiry & Rev. Comm'n R. 10, quoted in 435 U.S. at 830 n.l. 
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dissemination of information respecting the investigations of the confiden-
tial judicial review commission. The media defendant in Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia218 was found guilty of violating these provi-
sions by publishing an article which accurately reported on a pending 
inquiry by the commission, and which identified the state judge whose 
conduct was the subject of the investigation.219 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that a large number of states had statutes requiring con-
fidentiality with respect to judicial inquiry commissions.220 It listed three 
functions served by the requirement of confidentiality in commission pro-
ceedings: first, protection against harm to a judge's reputation which might 
unfairly result from frivolous complaints; second, maintenance of con-
fidence in the judicial system in preventing early disclosure of an other-
wise unfounded charge; and third, protection of complainants and 
witnesses from possible recrimination.221 The Court decided that the first 
amendment interest involved outweighed these functions after determin-
ing "that the publication Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies 
near the core of the First Amendment .... "222 Chief Justice Burger 
stressed that the state courts had not demonstrated in the case at hand 
that the facts were such as to justify criminal sanction: 
It is true that some risk of injury to the judge under inquiry, to the 
system of justice, or to the operation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission may be posed by premature disclosure, but the test re-
quires that the danger be "clear and present" and in our view the 
risk here falls far short of that requirement.223 
The interest in confidentiality may be significant and the dissemination 
of information during the pendency of the proceedings may jeopardize 
that interest, yet the Court concluded without question that the first 
amendment interest must prevail. 
Once again, the Court's decision in a case involving a balance of the 
first amendment against other interests is not difficult to understand. 
The state had not made an effective case for demonstrating the need for 
criminal prosecution.224 Still, the result is troublesome. While in Cox Broad-
218 435 u.s. 829 (1978). 
219 Id. at 831·32. 
220 Id. at 834. 
221 Id. at 833. 
222 Id. at 838. 
223 Id. at 845. The Court relied on the fact that in more than 40 states having similar 
commissions, criminal sanctions were not used to enforce the confidentiality against non-
participants. Id. at 841. 
22
' The Court did discuss alternatives which could be used, such as contempt proceedings 
against the breach of the confidentiality requirement by commission members or staff, 
the ability to require witnesses and members to take an oath of secrecy, and so forth. 
I d. at 841 n.12. It is not clear to this writer why such alternatives are so obviously superior 
to the approach taken by Virginia. In each of these alternative cases, the ultimate sanction 
(for violating the oath, for being held in contempt) would be a criminal or quasi-criminal 
penalty. But see Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, where he argued that confidentiality 
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casting the Court had before it a specific case involving fairly compelling 
facts, it refused to look to the facts in support of a privacy claim and 
focused exclusively on the first amendment issue. In Landmark Com-
munications no specific facts were presented by the defendant, yet broad 
policies were enunciated in support of the result. Still, the Court had lit-
tle trouble rejecting the privacy claim. 
Some of the questions which remained open after Cox Broadcasting and 
Landmark Communications were considered in Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co. 225 The proceedings were directed to be closed by the state 
statute and were actually closed.226 A strong argument was made as to 
a countervailing interest which would be served by the confidentiality 
of the proceedings. 
The West Virginia Code provided: "[N]or shall the name of any child, 
in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, be published in 
any newspaper without a written order of the court"; and "[a] person who 
violates ... a provision of this chapter for which punishment has not 
been specifically provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... "227 In 
1978 a junior high school student was shot and killed at school by a 
fourteen-year-old classmate. The classmate was identified by numerous 
eyewitnesses and was arrested by police soon after the incident. The media 
defendant learned of the shooting by monitoring the police band radio. 
Reporters and photographers were dispatched to the school. They ob-
tained the name of the assailant by asking various witnesses. The follow-
ing day the newspaper published a story about the shooting including 
the juvenile's name and picture.226 
"The predominant philosophy of the juvenile justice system in the twen-
tieth century has been one of positivism and rehabilitation. Protecting 
confidentiality in the juvenile process has been a central but controver-
sial tenet of this philosophy."229 In Daily Mail the state effectively argued 
the need for confidentiality by linking it to this goal of rehabilitating 
was a high government interest. He decided, however, that the state could not punish 
the newspaper: 
If the constitutional protection of a free press means anything, it means that 
government cannot take it upon itself to decide what a newspaper may and 
may not publish. Though government may deny access to information and 
punish its theft, government may not prohibit or punish the publication of 
that information once it falls into the hands of the press, unless the need for 
secrecy is manifestly overwhelming. 
Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
205 443 u.s. 97 (1979). 
""' Id. at 98-100. 
227 W. VA ConE §§ 49-7-3 to -7-20 (1976). 
228 443 U.S. at 99-100. 
229 Comment, Freedom of the Press vs. Juvenile Anonymity: A Conflict Between Constitu-
tional Priorities and Rehabilitation, 65 IOWA L. REv.1471, 1471 (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
230 Brief of Petitioners at 9·17, Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
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juvenile delinquents,230 "the primary goal of the juvenile justice system."231 
Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, stressed that "publicity may 
have a harmful impact on the rehabilitation of a juvenile offender."232 In 
support of his proposition, Justice Rehnquist referred to an empirical 
psychological study on the effects of publicity on a juvenile.233 For Justice 
Rehnquist, a prohibition against publication of the names of youthful of-
fenders was a small price to pay to promote the state policy. "[A] State's 
interest in preserving the anonymity of its juvenile offenders-an interest 
that I consider to be, in the words of the Court, of the 'highest order'-
far outweighs any minimal interference with freedom of the press that 
a ban on publication of the youths' names entails."234 
The remainder of the Court235 disagreed with Justice Rehnquist. For 
the majority, the focal point was "simply the power of a state to punish 
the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully 
obtained by a newspaper."236 The Court noted that the only interest ad-
vanced to justify the statute was the protection of the anonymity of the 
juvenile offender. "It is asserted that confidentiality will further his 
231 Comment, supra note 229, at 1483. As noted in S.A.S. v. Dis. Court, __ Colo. __ , 
623 P.2d 58, 60 (1981) (citation omitted): 
In order to protect the young from the stigma frequently associated with 
criminal proceedings, a petition in delinquency is classified as civil in character. 
The state's role in such a proceeding is not that of a prosecutor in a criminal 
case, but rather the role of parens patriae to protect the welfare of the child. 
= 443 U.S. at 108 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
233 Recently, two clinical psychologists conducted an investigation into the effects 
of publicity on a juvenile. They concluded that publicity 'placed additional stress 
on [the juvenile] during a difficult period of adjustment in the community, 
and it interfered with his adjustment at various points when he was other-
wise proceeding adequately.' Publication of the youth's name and picture also 
led to confrontations between the juvenile and his peers while he was in deten-
tion. While this study obviously is not controlling, it does indicate that the 
concerns that prompted enactment of state laws prohibiting publication of the 
names of juvenile offenders are not without empirical support. 
I d. (quoting Howard, Grisso & Neems, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 CLEAR· 
INGHOUSE REV. 203, 210 (1977)). The subject of this study was the eleven-year-old boy accused 
of the shooting in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). Id . 
.., 443 U.S. at 107. Justice Rehnquist concurred because the statute did not accomplish 
its stated purpose. Only newspapers were prohibited from printing the names of the youths, 
with the statute excluding electronic media and other forms of publication. I d. at 110. The 
majority of the Court agreed. I d. at 104-05. It disagreed, however, with his conclusion that 
"a generally effective ban on publication that applied to all forms of mass communication, 
electronic and print media alike, would be constitutional," id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring); see id. at 102-03 (majority opinion). 
235 Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. 443 U.S. at 106. 
236 Id. at 105-06. The Court relied heavily on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), where 
the state had not permitted a criminal defendant to impeach a prosecution witness on the 
basis of his juvenile record. The Court had struck down the state's ruling, finding that 
the state's policy had to be subordinated to the defendant's sixth amendment right of con-
frontation. But see Justice Rehnquist's response to this point: 
In Davis, where the defendant's liberty was at stake, the Court stated that 
'[s]erious damage to the strength of the State's case would have been a real 
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rehabilitation because publication of the name may encourage further an-
tisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose future employ-
ment or suffer other consequences for this single offense."237 The majority 
opinion of the Chief Justice did not substantively analyze this claim, but 
merely stated that "[t]he magnitude of the State's interest in this statute 
is not sufficient to justify application of a criminal penalty to 
respondents."238 Because forty-five other states had similar confidentiality 
statutes without criminal penalties, the State of West Virginia had not 
demonstrated that its action was "necessary to further the state interests 
asserted."239 
The Daily Mail case represents a resounding triumph for the media. 
The state presented a very strong case: This was a proceeding which 
had traditionally been found to be confidential, empirical evidence was 
offered in support of the need for confidentiality, and the media's infor-
mation was received outside of the closed official proceedings. Indeed, 
the Court chose not to dispute Justice Rehnquist's point that "[p]ublica-
tion of the names of juvenile offenders may seriously impair the 
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and handicap the youths' 
prospects for adjustment in society and acceptance by the public."240 Even 
granting such an interference, the Court found that the first amendment 
interest in the dissemination of information concerning the proceedings 
prevailed.241 One can seriously challenge this conclusion. No doubt the 
reporting of the basic incident and the proceedings was newsworthy and 
deserved protection under the first amendment. It is not clear, however, 
what the interest of the public is in finding out the name of the delin-
quent. Nor is it clear what the adverse impact of a contrary Court ruling 
would be on the media and the public. Was not Justice Rehnquist's point 
well taken? Is this not a trivial interference with the media's function 
of keeping the public well informed about newsworthy events? The Court 
possibility had petitioner been allowed to pursue this line of inquiry [related 
to the juvenile offender's record].' The State also could have protected the 
youth from exposure by not using him to make out its case. By contrast, in 
this case the State took every step that was in its power to protect the juvenile's 
name, and the minimal interference with the freedom of the press caused by 
the ban on publication of the youth's name can hardly be compared with the 
possible deprivation of liberty involved in Davis. Because in each case we must 
carefully balance the interest of the State in pursuing its policy against the 
magnitude of the encroachment on the liberty of speech and of the press that 
the policy represents, it will not do simply to say, as the Court does, that 
the 'important rights created by the First Amendment must be considered 
along with the rights of defendants guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.' 
443 U.S. at 109 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
237 Id. at 104. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 102, 105. 
••• Id. at 107-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
211 See note 238 & accompanying text supra. 
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refused to address these questions, deferring as before to the first amend-
ment contentions, which lacked considerable strength in this particular 
case.242 As in Cox Broadcasting and Landmark Communications, one must 
question the Court's lack of consideration of interests other than the first 
amendment. 
C. Televising Trials 
The televising of trials is an area quite apart from the previous discus-
sions. The media are not closed out of proceedings. They are not forbid-
den to disseminate information and are not restricted as to the content 
of the information they publish. There is no punishment, civil or criminal, 
for the act of publishing. The question here is whether the electronic media 
shall have access to the criminal trial so that the trial process may be 
photographed or televised. 
Throughout recent history, lawyers have been both skeptical about the 
media need for photographic coverage of criminal trials (whether still 
cameras or television) and apprehensive about the potential for disrup-
tion. Nowhere was this fear realized more clearly than in the spectacular 
trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the Lindbergh kidnapping.243 The Ame;ican 
2
'
2 The majority could have decided the case on the equal protection ground that only 
newspapers were covered under the statute. See note 234 & accompanying text supra. 
Instead, this point became somewhat of an afterthought. See 443 U.S. at 104·05. 
243 State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935). 
The scene was well described in Seidman, supra note 7, at 13-14 (footnotes omitted): 
Guilty or innocent, Bruno Richard Hauptmann certainly did not receive a 
trial calculated to determine the truth in a reliable fashion. The jury's verdict 
served only to formalize a verdict reached months earlier by the press. From 
the moment the Lindbergh child was seized, press coverage was intense and 
unremitting. Although the hysteria abated somewhat during the long search 
for the kidnapper, it began anew upon Hauptmann's arrest. Reams of copy 
were published examining every scrap of evidence tending to implicate Haupt· 
mann. By the time of the trial, most major papers had established small bureaus 
in Flemington and had conducted massive advertising campaigns boasting of 
their coverage. 
Flemington, a peaceful town of 2500 with a one-man police force, was simply 
not prepared to deal with the 64,000 sightseers and 16,000 automobiles that 
descended on it. Predictably, complete bedlam reigned outside the courthouse. 
The situation was only slightly less chaotic in the courtroom itself. The media 
and the spectators constantly disrupted court proceedings. Elaborate telegraph 
equipment was installed inside the courthouse, and although the trial judge 
prohibited the taking of pictures inside the courtroom itself, his order was 
openly flouted. Indeed, sound and motion picture equipment was plainly vis· 
ible in the balcony of the courtroom throughout the trial. 
Despite sequestration during the trial, the jury obviously was exposed to 
massive pretrial publicity. Moreover, each day as the jurors walked up the 
courthouse steps, they passed through a gauntlet of reporters, newsboys, and 
ordinary citizens making bets on the case, shouting "Burn Hauptmann," and 
selling souvenir reproductions of the kidnap ladder. The jurors ate in a public 
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Bar Association formally adopted a rule in direct response to the adverse 
impact of massive media coverage in that world famous case: 
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and 
decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during ses-
sions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting 
of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity 
of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with 
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.244 
In 1952 a special committee of the ABA produced a report which caused 
the House of Delegates to amend this canon to proscribe televising court 
proceedings as well.245 A majority of states adopted the substance of this 
rule.246 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also prohibits camera 
coverage of trials: "The taking of photographs in the court room during 
the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial pro-
ceeding~ from the court room shall not be permitted by the court."247 
A recent poll of practicing lawyers reflected once again the overwhelm-
ing sentiment against allowing proceedings to be televised: 
dining room, separated only by a cloth screen from reporters discussing the 
case over lunch. Even during deliberations, the jury could hear the mob that 
had gathered outside the courthouse screaming "Kill Hauptmann! Kill 
Hauptmann!" 
2
" ABA CANONS 'GF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 35, reprinted in 62 ABA REP.1123, 1134-35 (1937). 
205 77 ABA REP. 110, 257 (1952). The Canon was recodified as 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct which provides: 
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking 
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during 
sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may 
authorize: 
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of 
evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial 
administration; 
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing of investitive, 
ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings; 
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate 
court proceedings under the following conditions: 
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the dignity 
of the proceedings; 
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or re-
corded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and 
reproduction; 
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has 
been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and 
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in educa-
tional institutions. 
ABA CoDE OF JuDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3A(7) (1980) . 
... Pequignot, From Estes to Chandler: Shijti71{1 the Constitutional Burden of Courtroom 
Cameras to the States, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 315, 319 (1981); Petition of Post-Newsweek Sta-
tions, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979). 
2<7 FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. 
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Lawyers' attitudes toward statements regarding televised 
courtroom proceedings, United States, 1979 
[NOTE: this table presents the findings of a survey done by Kane, 
Parsons and Associates for the American Bar Association Journal. 
Telephone interviews were conducted with a random sample of 601 
lawyers who are members of the American Bar Association.]2' 8 
[percentages] 
Dis-
Agree agree 
with with 
Agree reser- reser- Disagree Not 
strongly vations vations strongly sure 
Television cameras in the 
courtroom would tend to 
distract witnesses 55 
TV cameras in the court-
room should be discour-
aged as they will be used 
to show the more sensa-
tional aspects of a trial 
only 47 
The use of televised pro-
ceedings should not be 
allowed as they will en-
courage lawyers and 
judges to grandstand for 
the TV audience 39 
Televised courtroom pro-
ceedings would enhance 
the public concept of our 
system of justice 16 
Televised courtroom pro-
ceedings should be en-
couraged because citizens 
are entitled to see our 
courts in operation 15 
Barring television from 
courtrooms discriminates 
against that news source 9 
20 
23 
25 
21 
18 
11 
15 8 2 
20 8 2 
20 14 2 
26 34 3 
26 40 1 
19 59 2 
Indeed, as recently as September 1980, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States adopted a rule prohibiting the taking of photographs and 
the use of radio or television broadcasting in the courtroom: 
The taking of photographs and operation of tape recorders in the 
:us Lawyers Aren't Convinced that TV Belongs in Courtroams, 65 A.B.A.J. 1306, 1308 (1979). 
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courtroom or its environs during the progress of or in connection with 
judicial proceedings ... is prohibited. A judge may, however, permit 
(1) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation 
of evidence or the perpetuation of a record, and (2) the broadcasting, 
televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or 
naturalization proceedings.249 
279 
Several arguments have been made respecting the adverse impact of 
cameras in the courtroom. The major points were succinctly set out by 
columnist James Reston: 
They would be a distracting influence and make it more difficult 
to get the truth out of witnesses, whose powers of observation, recollec-
tion and communication are already limited in .the emotional stresses 
of a courtroom. 
They would encourage jurors to think about themselves on camera 
rather than concentrating on the evidence, and tempt lawyers to play 
to the cameras rather than to the jury. 
While they would extend the process of justice to a much wider 
audience, they would in many if not most cases give that audience 
a distorted picture of the proceedings.250 
A case illustrating the potential for disruption by cameras in the court-
room is that of Billie Sol Estes, a well-known financier and friend of 
Presidents who was convicted of swindling numerous farmers.251 The Texas 
Judicial Canons allowed the trial judge, in his discretion, to direct the 
televising and photographing of court proceedings.252 The difficulty in Estes 
was that the proceedings looked very much like a circus.253 "Massive 
pretrial publicity total[ed] 11 volumes of press clippings .... "254 
[At pretrial proceedings when the case was first called for trial,] 
all available seats in the courtroom were taken and some 30 persons 
stood in the aisles .... [A]t least 12 cameramen were engaged in the 
courtroom throughout the hearing .... Cables and wires were snaked 
across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's 
bench and others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table. 
[All parties] conceded that the activities ... led to considerable disrup-
tion of the hearings.255 
... Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System 
on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, supra note 140, at 535-36. 
250 Reston, Television And The Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1981, §A, at 23, col. 5. See 
also Tongue and Lintott, The Case Against Television in the Courtroom, 16 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 777 (1980). (Justice Tongue sits on the Oregon Supreme Court.) 
251 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).Estes continues to have difficulties with the criminal 
justice system. See Horton v. United States, 646 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming convic-
tion for defrauding United States). 
252 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965). 
253 See id. at 536. See also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975). The issue also 
arose in the Sam Sheppard case, though the disposition there primarily rested on the adverse 
pretrial publicity. See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra . 
... 381 u.s. 532, 535 (1965). 
255 Id. at 535·36. 
280 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:235 
Though this extreme situation was altered somewhat at trial,256 a good 
deal of television coverage occurred, and this coverage was broadcast the 
same day it was taken.257 According to the Court, on one occasion the 
video tapes were rebroadcast in place of the "late movie".258 
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the defendant claimed 
that his due process rights had been violated by the televising and broad-
casting of the pretrial proceedings and the trial. Six separate opinions 
were written. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court established what ap-
peared to be a per se rule that the televising of proceedings, over the 
objection of the defendant, denied due process rights. In response to the 
state's contention that no prejudice had been shown by the petitioner 
as resulting from the televising, Justice Clark stated: "Television in its 
present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in 
which it may cause prejudice to an accused. Still one cannot put his finger 
on its specific mischief and prove with particularity wherein he was 
prejudiced."259 Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Douglas and 
Goldberg, made the point even more directly, stating 
[t]hat the televising of criminal trials is inherently a denial of due 
process .... The record in this case presents a vivid illustration of 
the inherent prejudice of televised criminal trials and supports our 
conclusion that this is the appropriate time to make a definitive ap-
praisal of television in the courtroom.260 
This view of a per se rule commanded the four votes indicated above.261 
Four Justices dissented,262 finding that there was no per se constitu-
tional rule against the introduction of television into a courtroom. They 
also found that there had been no showing that under the circumstances 
of the particular trial the petitioner was denied his constitutional rights.263 
The real issue, therefore, centered on the position of the ninth Justice, 
258 Ultimately, the televising of the trial itself was restrained compared to the pretrial 
proceedings. 
A booth had been constructed at the back of the courtroom which was painted 
to blend with the permanent structure of the room. It had an aperture to 
allow the lens of the cameras an unrestricted view of the courtroom. All televi· 
sion cameras and newsreel photographers were restricted to the area of the 
booth when shooting film or telecasting. 
(L]ive telecasting was prohibited during a great portion of the actual trial. 
Id. at 537. 
257 See id. 
258 I d. at 538. 
259 Id. at 544. 
260 ld. at 552 (Warren, C. J., concurring). 
261 While Justice Harlan concurred, he did not subscribe to the Court's per se analysis. 
Id. at 588-90 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
262 Id. at 601. 
263 Id. at 602 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Black, Brennan and White, JJ.). Even 
the dissenters recognized that "the introduction of television into a courtroom is, at least 
in the present state of the art, an extremely unwise policy. It invites many constitutional 
risks, and it detracts from the inherent dignity of the courtroom." Id. at 601. 
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Justice Harlan. He concurred in the Court's judgment, but in his separate 
opinion he left some doubt as to how much of Justice Clark's opinion he 
supported. In Justice Harlan's view, although television in the courtroom 
could have negative effects, prohibiting it could preclude states' "pro-
cedural experimentation."264 Justice Harlan concluded: 
[T]here is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in 
the courtroom, and, at least as to a notorious criminal trial such as 
this one, the considerations against allowing television in the courtroom 
so far outweigh the countervailing factors advanced in its support as 
to require a holding that what was done in. this case infringed the fun-
damental right to a fair trial assured by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.265 
The confusion as to the Estes holding was fueled, to a large extent, 
by the egregious facts presented there. One federal court characterized 
Justice Harlan's opinion as favoring the per se rule "in a 'notorious' case 
which is 'heavily publicized' and 'highly sensational.' Thus, Estes can be 
construed as standing for the proposition that television coverage of a 
'notorious' criminal case absent the defendant's vaiidly obtained consent 
is a per se violation of due process.''266 Other judges viewed Estes as being 
limited to the situation in which the presence of cameras in the court-
room actually was shown to have prevented a fair trial,267 while still others 
took a very broad view of Estes. 268 
With this shaky constitutional precedent in mind, the states proceeded 
cautiously. Many states, following the lead of the American Bar Associa-
tion, refused to allow any electronic coverage. Others limited such 
coverage to particular kinds of proceedings, such as appellate arguments. 
204 Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
205 Id. at 587, 591 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan added: 
In the context of a trial of intense public interest, there is certainly a strong 
possibility that the timid or reluctant witness, for whom a court appearance 
even at its traditional best is a harrowing affair, will become more timid or 
reluctant when he finds that he will also be appearing before a 'jtidden au-
dience' of unknown but large dimensions. There is certainly a strong possibility 
that the 'cocky' witness having a thirst for the limelight will become more 
'cocky' under the influence of television. And who can say that the juror who 
is gratified by having been chosen for a front-line case, an ambitious prosecutor, 
a publicity-minded defense attorney, and even a conscientious judge will not 
stray, albeit unconsciously, from doing what 'comes naturally' into pluming 
themselves for a satisfactory television 'performance'? 
Id. at 591. 
... Zaehringer v. Brewer, 635 F.2d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 1980). Enormous problems would 
be created, however, if trial judges actually had to determine which cases were sufficient-
ly "notorious." 
267 State v. Newsome, 177 N.J. Super. 221, 226-28, 426 A.2d 68, 71-72 (1980) . 
... See Bradley v. Texas, 470 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Television coverage of a trial 
is considered inherently prejudicial .... "). But see Merola, Who'd Beat on a Suspect While 
the Camera's Running?, TV GUIDE, July 25,1981, at 17 (Mr. Merola is the district attorney 
of Bronx County in New York City.). 
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A few began to allow television coverage of criminal trials.269 In Chandler 
v. Florida,210 which ultimately came before the Supreme Court, the state 
had chosen to go farther than any other by allowing television coverage 
of criminal trials, even over the specific objection of the defendant. 
The state of Florida embarked on an ambitious pilot program in 1975 
for televising one civil and one criminal trial under specific guidelines 
requiring the consent of all parties.271 After this program ended in 1978, 
the state supreme court reviewed briefs, reports, and studies, including 
its own survey of interested parties, and concluded that "on balance there 
[was] more to be gained than lost by permitting electronic media coverage 
of judicial proceedings subject to standards for stich coverage."272 The 
Florida Supreme Court then promulgated a permanent canon allowing 
for such coverage.273 
The implementing guidelines required by the Florida canon specified 
in detail the type of equipment to be used and the nianner of its use.274 
As noted by Chief Justice Burger, the restrictions are designed to 
eliminate any adverse impact which might otherwise be present: 
[N]o more than one television camera and only one camera technician 
are allowed. Existing recording systems used by court reporters are 
used by broadcasters for audio pickup. Where more than one broad-
cast news organization seeks to cover a trial, the media must pool 
coverage. No artificial lighting is allowed. The equipment is positioned 
in a fixed location, and it may not be moved during trial. Videotaping 
equipment must be remote from the courtroom. Film, videotape, and 
lenses may not be changed while the court is in session. No audio 
recording of conferences between lawyers, between parties and 
counsel, or at the bench is permitted. The judge has sole and plenary 
discretion to exclude coverage of certain witnesses, and the jury may 
not be filmed. The judge has discretionary power to forbid coverage 
whenever satisfied that coverage may have a deleterious effect on 
the paramount right of the defendant to a fair trial. The Florida 
269 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 565 n.6 (1981); see also In rePetition of Post-
Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 786-91 app. 2 (Fla. 1979) (reprinting National 
Center for State Courts, Television in the Courtroom: Recent Developments, Feb. 7, 1979); 
see also Carter, Telwision in the Courtrooms, 5 STATE CT. J. 6 (1981). 
27G 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
271 Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 327 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1976). 
272 Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 780 (Fla. 1979). This 
opinion contains an excellent discussion of the various arguments to be made as to the 
desirability of televising criminal trials. See id. at 779-81. 
273 FLA. CANON 3A(7). This canon provides: 
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control 
the conduct of proceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent 
distractions, and (iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending 
cause, electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial pro-
ceedings in the appellate and trial courts of this state shall be allowed in ac-
cordance with standards of conduct and technology promulgated by the 
Supreme Court of Florida. 
27
' 370 So. 2d at 783-85 app. 1, A. 
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Supreme Court has the right to revise these rules as experience dic-
tates, or indeed to bar all broadcast coverage of photography in 
courtrooms.275 
283 
The defendants in Chandler had been charged with the relatively routine 
offenses of conspiracy to commit burglary, grand larceny, and possession 
of burglary tools. While the case was hardly notorious along the lines 
of Estes, it was not ordinary either. At the time of their arrest, the defen-
dants were Miami Beach police officers. A television camera was in place 
for one afternoon during which the state presented the trial testimony 
of its chief witness. No coverage occurred in connection with the defen-
dants' case. The defendants argued that the Florida rule was unconstitu-
tional on its face and as applied, but the arguments were rejected at the 
state court level.276 The defendants in argument before the United States 
Supreme Court read the Estes case as announcing a per se constitutional 
rule that televising of any portion of a criminal trial without the defen-
dant's consent is a denial of due process.277 
Chief Justice Burger, focusing on Justice Harlan's swing vote in Estes,218 
concluded: 
[E]stes is not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring 
still photographic, radio and television coverage in all cases and under 
all circumstances. It does not stand as an absolute ban on state ex-
perimentation with an evolving technology, which, in terms of modes 
of mass communication, was in its relative infancy in 1964, and is, 
even now, in a state of continuing change.219 
While at least two members of the Court, Justices Stewart and White, 
thought that Estes did announce a per se rule and should be overruled,280 
no member of the Court281 was willing in 1981 to accept such a per se 
rule. As stated by the Chief Justice: "The risk of juror prejudice is pre-
sent in any publication of a trial, but the appropriate safeguard against 
such prejudice is the defendant's right to demonstrate that the media's 
215 449 U.S. at 566. 
216 Id. at 567-68. See Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64, 69 (Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam), affd, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
211 Id. at 570. 
218 See notes 264-68 & accompanying text supra. 
219 449 U.S. at 573-74. The Chief Justice emphasized the limitations imposed by Justice 
Harlan in his opinion: " 'At the present juncture, I can only conclude that televised trials, 
at least in cases like this one, possess such capabilities for interfering with the even course 
of the judicial process that they are constitutionally banned.'" I d. at 573 (quoting 381 U.S. 
at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (emphasis added by Chief Justice Burger). 
280 449 U.S. at 583 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Although concurring in the judgment, I 
cannot join the opinion of the Court because I do not think the convictions in this case 
can be affirmed without overruling Estes v. Texas.''); id. at 587 (White, J., concurring) ("I 
think Estes is fairly read as establishing a per se constitutional rule against televising any 
criminal trial if the defendant objects. So understood, Estes must be overruled to affirm 
the judgment below."). 
281 Justice Stevens did not participate in the case. Id. at 583. 
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coverage of his case ... compromised the ability of the particular jury 
that heard the case to adjudicate fairly."282 
The Court acknowledged that since Estes had been decided, many states 
had allowed experimentation and many of the negative factors found in 
Estes-cumbersome equipment, cables, poor lighting, and the number of 
camera technicians-were no longer of great concern.283 The Court thus 
decided that "no one has been able to present empirical data sufficient 
to establish the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an 
adverse effect .... "284 Because the defendants were not able to offer 
any evidence of particular prejudice,285 the Court held that, unlike the 
situation in Estes, there was no showing that the trial was in any way 
affected by television coverage.286 
The difficulty with the approach of the Court is that few defendants 
will ever be able to show prejudice resulting from the television cameras, 
apart from the spectacular case such as Estes.281 More importantly, it is 
not clear to this writer why such a showing should have to be made by 
the defendant. This is not a case where severe first amendment restric-
tions are being imposed on the media. The sources of information are 
not being limited or cut off. No punishment of any sort is being meted 
out for the content of the reporting. Can anyone doubt that-at least 
in some cases-the televising of proceedings will have some serious im-
pact on the trial participants,288 an impact which will not be tangible and 
will not likely lead to appealable issues? 
If the central thesis is that televising of criminal proceedings will 
educate the public far better than other forms of coverage, does not this 
assertion prove too much? If it is educational in the context in which a 
defendant stands to be deprived of his or her liberty, is it not also educa-
tional for the public to understand how the United States Supreme Court 
operates? The Court does not, however, allow electronic media coverage 
282 /d. at 575. 
283 /d. at 576-77. 
'"' /d. at 578-79. The Chief Justice recognized that the "data thus far assembled" were 
"limited" and "non-scientific." Id. at 576 n.11. 
"
5 /d. at 568. The only evidence was to the contrary because at voir dire the jurors 
were asked if the presence of the camera would in any way compromise their ability to 
consider the case. /d. at 567. 
286 /d. at 582. See Platte, TV in the Courtroom: Right of Access?, 3 COM. & L. 11 (1981). 
'
87 Of course, even after Chandler, restrictions on television may be legitimately imposed 
so as to control prejudicial publicity and protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. The 
obvious example is the notorious Atlanta child murder trial which, the trial judge ruled, 
could not be televised. The court there held that under the Georgia rules consent of all 
parties was a prerequisite, but in any case, televising of the proceedings would not be 
in the public interest in view of the potential harm "to those children and families who 
were adversely affected by the ordeal" in the city of Atlanta. State v. Williams, [1981] 
29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2516. 
288 As Justice White noted in Chandler, "the majority does not underestimate or minimize 
the risks of televising criminal trials over a defendant's objections. I agree that those risks 
are real and should not be permitted to develop into the reality of an unfair trial." 449 
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of appellate arguments before it.289 The Court in Chandler did not res-
pond to these issues, but again stressed the importance of media coverage 
of criminal trials. Despite the importan!!e of such coverage, the Court's 
focus on it seems to miss the mark. 
In fairness to the Court, it did make clear that there was no constitu-
tional right of media access with respect to electronic coverage of trials. 
Instead, relying on the Florida rules, it wrote that trial judges would 
have to be vigilant to make sure no prejudice was suffered by defendants 
in these televised cases.290 
In many respects, Chandler is a seminal case. Reversing the traditional 
legal view of electronic coverage of trials, the Court refused to adopt 
a per se rule against such coverage.291 It is true that the Court also did 
not establish any constitutional right of access regarding electronic 
coverage, but made explicit that the key was a showing of specific pre-
judice to the defendant. This showing will be a difficult one to make ab-
sent a circuslike atmosphere.292 The ruling in Chandler is, thus, a very 
U.S. at 588-89 (White, J., concurring). See also the comments of Justice Stewart in 14 THIRD 
BRANCH 3 (1982): 
I think a good argument can be made against televising the proceedings 
in a trial court, the argument being that the televising of such proceedings 
would distort the administration of justice, would distort the actions of the 
witnesses and the members of the jury and even the judge, conscious as they 
would be that they were not just in a courtroom but in everybody's living room. 
For an interesting exchattke on this point by two practicing lawyers, see Allied Educa-
tional Foundation, Television in the Courtroom-Limited Benefits, Vital Risks?, 3 CoM. & 
L. 30 (1981) (educational conference). 
289 Even at the swearing-in ceremony of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, only reporters 
and artists were allowed to record the event in accordance with the Supreme Court's policy 
banning television, tape-recording, and picture-taking of proceedings. Washington Post, Sept. 
25, 1981, S A, at 3, col. 1 (reprinted in the Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Sept. 26, 1981, 
S 1, at 3, col. 1). At this time an intense controversy exists in the California Supreme Court. 
Despite strenuous objections from two Justices, the California court has now agreed to 
allow cameras to film oral arguments for the first time in the Court's history. Chief Justice 
Byrd noted that the court wished to treat litigants fairly while "mak[ing] court proceedings 
more open and understandable to the public." Hager, Cameras Allowed to Enter Supreme 
Court, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 4, 1981, § 1, at 3, col. 5. The dissenting Justices, however, 
stated that " 'it is regrettable that a majority of the members of this court have yielded 
to the persistence of an entertainment media.' ... 'As a result, this temple of justice 
is being transformed into a theater, and lawyers and justices are to be the actors.'" Id. 
at 3-21, col. 5. 
290 449 U.S. at 574. 
"The Florida guidelines place on trial judges positive obligations to be on guard to pro-
tect the fundamental right of the accused to a fair trial .... [I]t is significant that Florida 
requires that objections of the accused to coverage be heard and considered on the record 
by the trial court.'' Id. at 577. 
201 Tornquist & Grifall, Television in the Courtroom: Devil or Saint? 17 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 345 (1981); Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Siwek: Estes Revisited, or A Modest Proposal 
for the Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641. 
292 See Zimmerman, supra note 291. One reporter reviewed the evidence and received 
these quotes from judges and lawyers: "'I've yet to see how they detract from the ad-
ministration of justice'"; " 'it's worked better than we anticipated' "; " 'after two or three 
minutes, everybody in the courtroom forgets the cameras and the mikes are there.'" Lind-
286 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:235 
broad victory for the media.293 Without any showing by the media of a 
great need to broadcast the proceedings or a showing that such pro-
ceedings would not be inherentJy prejudicial, the Court recognized the 
importance of open access absent a compelling showing of prejudice by 
the defendant.294 The impact of Chandler has already been widespread. 
Numerous states have adopted rules paralleling the Florida experiment,295 
and as the technology improves one expects further experimentation.296 
CONCLUSION 
There has always been and will continue to be a great public interest 
in criminal trials. These events are newsworthy and central to the 
democratic process and need to be fully and freely reported by the various 
news media. Within the last decade the Supreme Court has strongly ac-
cepted this view, moving away from an occupation with the sixth amend-
ment and fourteenth amendment rights of the accused on trial and toward 
the legitimate interest of the media to open access to criminal trials. In-
stead of merely deferring to a claim of potential prejudice to the trial 
rights of the defendant, the Court has become greatly concerned with 
the impact of restrictions on the dissemination of information under the 
first amendment. 
The position of the Court makes a good deal of sense in the first two 
areas discussed in this article. Prior restraint orders should be virtually 
impossible to obtain,297 as these orders completely cut off the media from 
the news events. Similarly, closure orders should only be granted in the 
rarest of circumstances. In this sense Richmond Newspapers is right, but 
Gannett is wrong. If the press cannot be routinely shut out from trials, 
sey, After 5 Years, Judges and Lawyers See Courts Adjusting to the Camera's Eye, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 7, 1981, at 6, col. 1. 
293 Cf. Pequignot, supra note 246. 
294 It is surprising and disappointing that the Court was not willing to evaluate the various 
interests involved; instead it deferred to the media's claims. One would have hoped for 
a test somewhat parallel to that used in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case 
in which the Court discussed the procedural safeguards required under the due process 
clause. There the Court looked to three factors (private interest, risk of erroneous depriva-
tion, the government's interest) in reaching its determination of the due process mandate. 
Id. at 335. In Chandler the Court did not engage in such a weighing process. 
295 Tornquist & Grifall, supra note 291; Erickson, COLORADO LAWYER, Sept. 1981, at 2199, 
2200, indicates that 31 states now permit television and camera coverage of trial or ap-
pellate proceedings. For a good discussion of the manner in which this evolution has occur-
red, see Carter, supra note 269. The proposed Illinois rules are typical of the new trend. 
Section 61(c)(24) of the Supreme Court Rules as passed by the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion would allow the taking of photographs and broadcasting or televising of court pro-
ceedings "subject to conditions imposed by authority of the presiding judge." 
296 For a good discussion of the great improvements in the technology in this area, see 
Loewen, Cameras in the Courtroom: A Reconsideration, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 504 (1978). 
297 They may now be impossible to obtain under any circumstances, in light of the various 
concurring opinions in Nebraska Press. See notes 86·93 & accompanying text supra. 
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it is difficult to understand why no strong showing need be made by the 
trial judge in the vital pretrial setting. 
The other actions taken in this field by the Supreme Court are far less 
defensible. When the press is not being kept away from the proceedings, 
when they are free to report the important facts of the subject incident, 
as well as the pretrial hearings and the trial, the Court should be reluc-
tant to disregard other state interests. The privacy of rape victims and 
the goal of the state in keeping juvenile and judicial inquiry matters con-
fidential are significant. On the other hand, it is a subtle argument, in-
deed, to contend that first amendment interests are seriously affected 
by forbidding the reporting of the names of victims of crimes, juvenile 
delinquents, or judges not yet determined to have acted improperly. Of 
even greater concern is the Court's ruling in the televised trial case where 
the states were given much discretion, though questions regarding the 
limited educational value of such broadcasting and the adverse impact 
on the trial process were expressed.298 
In spite of the fears stated by many journalists,299 the media have fared 
quite well before the Supreme Court when the question involved the 
reporting of criminal trials. In many of these cases, the first amendment 
was quite properly given great weight. In others, however, the unwill-
ingness of the Justices to evaluate other, conflicting interests is troubling . 
... As noted by the Chief Justice in Chandler, the Conference of State Chief Justices, 
by a vote of 44 to 1, recently approved a resolution allowing the highest court of each 
state to promulgate rules regulating radio, television, and other photographic coverage 
of court proceedings. 449 U.S. at 564 n.4. 
299 For the views of Carl Stern and Bob Woodward, see notes 20, 99 & 169 supra; see 
also note 100 & accompanying text supra. 
